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EXPORT CARTELS AND VOLUNTARY EXPORT
RESTRAINTS BETWEEN TRADE
AND COMPETITION POLICY
Ulrich Immengat
Abstract: This article discusses the conflicts between trade regulation and competi-
tion policy. It begins with a survey of the effect of restrictive practices - particularly
those like export cartels that are exempted from competition law regulation - and
continues with a critique of national support and authorization for restrictive practices as
well as protective state activities, including antidumping rules, rules against "unfair"
trade practices, and voluntary export restraints. The article concludes with a summary of
unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral approaches to a more effective international regime
for competition policy. It also introduces the recommendation for a Draft International
Antitrust Code, which was submitted to GATT.
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I. INTRODUCTION
An increasing number of states, including most recently the formerly
socialist countries of Eastern Europe, have adopted antitrust legislation.
Rather than prohibit national cartels, however, most countries permit or en-
courage export cartels relating to foreign markets. Exporting countries
permit domestic export cartels because they expect to increase exports by
enabling domestic enterprises to compete more successfully in foreign mar-
kets. They expect to achieve this by reducing export costs and enhancing
bargaining power against foreign buyers and competitors. The question to
be examined in this paper is whether the existing rules exempting export
cartels from antitrust enforcement still serve the objective of promoting na-
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tional exports in light of the globalization of international trade and
production.
In addition to domestic legislation, export cartels must also take into
account the competition law of the importing country. Also, third countries
whose enterprises or markets are affected may express their interests or
even apply their competition law. The application of the importing coun-
tries' competition law is not only restricted by the general problems of
extraterritorial application but by political issues as well. In some cases, the
foreign governmental support of export cartels or, as in the OPEC case, its
direct involvement, has to be accepted as a matter of economic policy and
may immunize cartels from the competition law of the importing country.
If the government of the importing country initiates export restraints on
foreign undertakings for protectionist reasons, it is questionable whether
domestic competition law is still applicable. So-called voluntary export re-
straints ("VERs") and voluntary restraint agreements ("VRAs") have gained
significance while the implementation of import restrictions has become
more difficult in the developing GATT system. In the grey area between
trade and competition policy, between governmental and private restraints,
VERs have sometimes served as a means to circumvent both antitrust regu-
lation and GATT procedures. As a result of the Uruguay Round, VERs are
explicitly outlined in the GATT Agreement on Safeguards, which states that
they shall not be applied without fulfilling the requirements of the safeguard
clause of article XIX of GATT. Whether this amendment will successfully
fill the gap between the responsibility for governmental restraints in the
GATT System and the responsibility for private restraints under competi-
tion law remains to be answered.
Part II of this article examines how competition laws are applied to
domestic and foreign export cartels in different countries. Part III focuses
on the legislative rationales for exempting export cartels and describes the
economic consequences of export cartels on the exporting country, the im-
porting country, and international trade. While distinguishing between
governmental and private restraints, Part IV analyzes different approaches
to the arising problems. These include unilateral reforms of competition
law, bilateral agreements, regional cooperation and multilateral approaches
suggesting a "world competition law."
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II. LEGAL SITUATION: EXPORT CARTELS AND VER UNDER COMPETITION
LAW
A. Domestic Export Cartels Under Competition Law
1. Introduction
Export cartels restrict competition in foreign markets. Whether they
are subject to domestic competition law depends on the scope of application
of the law. Jurisdiction of competition law is based on either the "effect" of
anticompetitive activities on the domestic market irrespective of where
those activities were carried out ("effects principle"), or the fact that the an-
ticompetitive activities were carried out within the domestic territory
("principle of territoriality"). Under the principle of territoriality, national
competition law applies to domestic enterprises. Under the effects princi-
ple, only "mixed" export cartels which also involve domestic restraints of
competition are covered. The application of competition law and supervi-
sion on "pure" export cartels, which restrict exclusively competition in
foreign markets, can only be achieved by enacting additional, special rules.
A comparative analysis should consider the substantial requirements for ex-
emptions of pure, mixed and international export cartels. State control over
international export cartels is limited inasmuch as states generally are able
to prohibit only domestic enterprises from participating in international
cartels. The inability of any single state to prevent the formation of interna-
tional cartels by firms beyond the jurisdictional reach of its competition law
in tum becomes an incentive not to prohibit domestic firm participation.
Otherwise domestic products may be disadvantaged without corresponding
benefits to domestic consumers.
A comparative analysis should furthermore consider different degrees
of governmental and private enforcement of competition rules restricting
the activities of export cartels. In addition, active governmental promotion
of export cartels as a part of national trade policy must be considered with
regard to the application of the competition law of the importing country.
2. Domestic Export Cartels Under U.S. Antitrust Law
Export cartels relating to United States exports come under the gen-
eral prohibition of section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits "every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign
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nations." The broad scope of application has to be considered because it
covers not only domestic but also international trade.
In 1918 the Webb-Pomerene Act ("WPA")' was enacted to exempt
export associations "entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export
trade and actually engaged solely in such export trade" from the prohibi-
tions of the Sherman Act. The WPA was designed primarily to enable
exports of small and medium-sized firms without individual export ability,
and to form a countervailing power against foreign cartels. It was assumed
that the costs of exporting would be reduced by eliminating duplicate sales
organizations or by obtaining lower rates on export services such as insur-
ance and freight. Groups of relatively smaller scale U.S. producers would
more readily be able to enter into and survive in foreign markets in the face
of powerful combinations because of their reduced export costs and in-
creased financial resources supporting export programs. Higher prices and
improved sales terms generally would be obtained from foreign buyers, es-
pecially those organized into buying cartels. 2 One prerequisite for the
exemption is that the association does not restrain the domestic trade or the
export trade of a domestic competitor. The association must not enter into
any agreement that artificially or intentionally enhances or depresses prices
within the United States of commodities of the class exported by the asso-
ciation, or that substantially lessens competition within the United States or
otherwise restrains trade therein. 3 Hence the WPA exempts only pure ex-
port cartels; mixed export cartels are subject to the same rules as domestic
cartels. The exemption does not apply to international export cartels, as
stated in the case United States v. U.S. Alkali Export Association.4 Even
though the export cartel agreements in Alkali did not specifically allocate
the U.S. market, the Court determined that the participants in fact intended
to allocate the U.S. market. By limiting foreign exports into the United
States, the export cartel was assumed to cause anticompetitive spillover ef-
fects within the United States.
The Act provides that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) be noti-
fied of Webb-Pomerene Associations within thirty days after their creation. 5
Additional prerequisites for an antitrust exemption were requested by the
I Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1982).
2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC REPORT OF WEBB-POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS: A 50-
YEAR REVIEW 6 (1967).
3 15 U.S.C. § 62 (1982).
4 325 U.S. 196 (1945).
5 15 U.S.C. § 65 (1982).
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courts6 and the FTC. In United States v. Minnesota Mining &
Manufacturing Co., the Justice Department claimed that the participants ex-
ceeded the exemption for pure export trade associations. The Court held
that the following restrictions were inherent in any export association and
exempted, absent special circumstances: exclusive exporting arrangements
for the members, the refusal of the association to handle exports of non-
members, fixing of resale prices of foreign distributors or sales quotas, and
price-fixing agreements.7 The FTC also published a list of restrictions con-
sidered to be permitted.8 This list included the members' duty to export
exclusively through the association, rules restricting the members' right to
withdraw from the association, post-contractual statutory prohibition of
competition, and price-fixing and sales quotas agreements. In 1982 the
Export Trading Company Act was enacted to promote U.S. exports by re-
moving alleged impediments to U.S. export trade arising from antitrust
laws. U.S. firms had claimed that they were handicapped by U.S. law that
followed them into foreign markets. At the same time, the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvement Act narrowed the jurisdictional reach of the
Sherman Act with respect to export transactions by inserting section 6(a) of
the Sherman Act, which reads:
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving
trade or commerce (other than import trade or import com-
merce) with foreign nations unless
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably fore-
seeable effect
(a) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with
foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with
foreign nations; or
(b) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations,
of a person engaged in such trade or commerce on the United
States.
Although the Export Trading Company Act offered substantially
more protection to export associations than the WPA, it has not significantly
6 United States v. U.S. Alkali Export Ass'n, 325 U.S. 196 (1945); United States v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 965-66 (D.Mass. 1950); Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434
U.S. 308, 314 n.12 (1978); see generally BARRY E. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 99 (1979).
7 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. at 965-66.
8 See HAWK, supra note 6, at 99.
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promoted U.S. exports. 9 The small significance of export associations for
U.S. exports is due to relatively strict private and public antitrust enforce-
ment, and also from the strict prohibition against mixed cartels affecting
U.S. markets. This may be justified by the significance of domestic sales
compared with export sales, so that enforcing competition is preferable to
promoting exports.' 0
3. Domestic Export Cartels Under German Competition Law
The international scope of application of the German competition law
is defined by section 98(2) of the Law Against Restraints of Competition
("GWB") which follows the effects doctrine: "[T]his Act shall apply to all
restraints of competition which have effect in the area in which the Act
applies, even if they result from acts done outside such area." Three types
of German export cartels must be distinguished. Export cartels that regulate
domestic competition are covered by the general prohibition of cartels. 1'
Export cartels without domestic regulations that have domestic effects are
covered by the prohibition of cartels due to the effects doctrine.12 Pure ex-
port cartels that exclusively regulate competition in foreign markets without
domestic effects are also covered by the Act. These cartels did not previ-
ously fall under the scope of section 1 as stated in the Oil Pipe Lines case. 13
They did not even have to provide notice and the Federal Cartel Office
("FCO") had no supervision of this type of export cartel. Therefore, section
98 (2 (2)) was implemented, which expressly stated that the Act applies to
pure export cartels. Section 6 of the GWB also includes broad exemptions
for pure and mixed export cartels. The legislative intent of the exemptions
was similar to the Webb-Pomerene Act:
Many foreign countries have none or no restrictive antitrust
legislation. Other countries enacted general exemptions for
foreign trade (for instance the Webb-Pomerene Act in the
9 Paul Victor, Export Cartels: An Idea whose Time has Passed, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 571, 575
(1992); William W. Nye, An Economic Profile of Export Trading Companies, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 309,
311 (1993).
10 James D. Whitney, The Causes and Consequences of Webb-Pomerene Associations: A
Reappraisal, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 395, 413 (1993).
11 Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeshrankungen (Law Against Restraints of Competition) BGBI. 1 1081
(1957? [hereinafter GWB].
13 Decision of the Bundesgerichtshof in WIRTSHCAFT UND WETrBEWERB, (WuW/E BGH) at 1276,
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United States). It would be an unreasonable impediment for
German exporters if the Act provided stronger obligations for
them than for their foreign competitors. In addition, the for-
eign market is less known to the German exporter than for the
local competitors. This situation is often exploited by forcing
the German producers to offer their goods below market prices.
This causes a cut-throat competition including losses not only
for single firms but also for the German exchange balance. 14
The exemptions for both pure and mixed export cartels require that
the cartels serve "the protection and promotion of exports." An increase in
national exports, not simply in the exports or profits of the cartel members,
is therefore necessary. 15 Pure export cartels, which are exempted by section
6(l), must notify the Federal Cartel Office ("FCO").16 Section 6(2) of the
GWB provides for a case by case authorization of mixed export cartels by
the Federal Cartel Office. Even domestic restraints are taken into account if
they are "necessary" to the performance of the export cartel. "Necessary,"
for example, is an agreement between producers to require their German
export traders to resell in foreign markets only at fixed prices. If the export
traders were permitted to undersell the cartel members in foreign markets,
the export cartel would soon collapse.17
International cartels are not subject to special provisions. In general,
the exemptions of section 6 are applicable as stated in the FCO pronounce-
ment.18 In 1982, almost half of German export cartels included foreign
participants. 19 An international cartel which allocates world markets is
prohibited if restrictions of foreign exports to the German market are
included. 20 International export cartels frequently involve national quotas,
so it is doubtful that the requirement of "the protection and promotion of
exports" is met. This might be the case if German undertakings would not
14 Begandung zum Regierungsentwurf 1952, Bundestags-Drucksache 1/3462, at 17. 26.
15 FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 19 (1970); ALBRECHT VON DER HEYDEN, DAS
EXPORTKARTELL 109 (1972): Eckard Rehbinder, in GESETz GEGEN WErBEWERBSBESHCRANKUNGEN § 6,
at 69 (Immenga & Mestmacker eds.).
16 GWB § 9(l).
17 Decisions of the Federal Cartel Office, in WIRTSCHAFT UND WETTBEWERB (WuW/E BKartA) 197
"Hauer"; WuW/E BKartA 381 "Schwermetallhalbzeug."
18 Pronouncement No. 48/90 of the Federal Cartel Office concerning administrative rules on the
procedure for notification of export cartels, It (June 25, 1990).
19 The FCO determined in 1981-82 that out of 55 pure export cartels, 25 included foreign
participants. FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1981-82).
20 Rehbinder, supra note 15, § 6, at 179.
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be able to export at all or would export less without participation in a pow-
erful international cartel.21 The authorization for mixed export cartels 22 and
the exemption for pure export cartels23 both require that "the principles of
international treaties of the Federal Republic of Germany relating to trade in
goods or commercial services" not be violated. In other words, the
Government has indirect power to prohibit them. This could be done by
signing international treaties which prevent or induce a revocation of the
authorization by the FCO. By doing so the power of the executive branch is
not reduced and the independence of the Federal Cartel Office is guaran-
teed. This demonstrates the principle of alternative authorization by
political and competition authorities in German competition law.
4. Domestic Export Cartels Under European Competition Law
Article 85 of the European Community Treaty prohibits "all agree-
ments between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect trade between member states and
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition within the common market." Therefore, intra European
Community ("EC") export cartels restricting exports from one member
country to another are prohibited.
However, an export cartel relating to non-EC countries is "not in it-
self likely to restrict or distort competition within the'common market." 24
Such restrictions are subject to article 85 only if they have appreciable re-
percussions within the Community, which must affect not only one particu-
lar part of the Community, but must specifically affect trade between
member states.25 Such effects on trade between member states may occur if
traders in third countries are prevented from re-importing into the
Community. 26 In practice this is unlikely because of duplicate tariffs. Pure
21 FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, supra note 15; FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 54 (1971);
FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 88 (1973); Rehbinder, supra note 15, § 6, at 175; Erich
Hoppmann, Exportkartell und Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen, in EXPORTKARTELL UND
WETTBEWERB 74, 141 (Eichler et al. eds., 1964). A contrary opinion is expressed by Scherf in
FRANKFURTER KOMMENTAR, GWB § 6, at 148.
22 GWB §11(5), No. 3.
23 GWB §12 (2)(3).
24 Bulk Oil V. Sun, 1986 E.C.R. 559, 589.
25 Decision of the Commission (Junghans), 1977 O.J. (L 30/10) 14; see also EEC COMPETITION
LAW, A PRACTITIONERS GUIDE 22 (Ritter et al. eds., 1991).
26 Decision of the Commission (Goodyear Italiana), 1975 O.J. (L 38/110) 12; see GLEISS & HIRSCH,
KOMMENTAR ZUM EG-KARTELLRECHT art. 85, at 255 (4th ed. 1993).
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export cartels related to foreign countries without effects on the Common
Market are therefore not covered by article 85. No notification by pure ex-
port cartels is required, and no supervision exists. Therefore, European
competition law, according to which pure export cartels are not under the
scope of the prohibition of cartels, differs from other competition laws
where export cartels are subject to both competition law and exemptions. In
order to be legal, mixed export cartels with regulations restricting trade
between member states must apply for an exemption under article 85 (3).
International cartels are illegal to the extent they include or restrict trade
between member states. As a result, export cartels of EC member states are
generally supervised only by the member states' competition laws. The EC
competition law is only applied in exceptional circumstances since it pro-
tects only intra-EC trade.
5. Domestic Export Cartels Under Japanese Competition Law
Japanese export cartels may in principle fall under several prohibi-
tions of the Antimonopoly Law ("AIL"). Section 3 of the AML prohibits
private monopolization and unreasonable restraints of trade. Section 6
prohibits international agreements which contain unreasonable restraints of
trade or unfair business practices. Section 8 prohibits trade associations
from unreasonable restraints of trade and international agreements. The
Export-Import Transaction Act ("EITA") exempts from the Antimonopoly
Law27 and distinguishes five different types of export cooperations.
Agreements.concerning export trading of exporters (pure export cartels) are
exempted by notification by the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry ("MITI") within ten days.28 Agreements of exporters, 29 agree-
ments of producers or sellers30 concerning domestic transactions (mixed
export cartels) and export-import agreements 31 require an express authori-
zation by MITI. The differing rules for exporters, producers, and sellers
derive from the fact that Japanese exports have largely been handled
through export traders (indirect export). Activities of non-profit export
27 Yushutsunyii torihiki h6 (Export-Import Transaction Act) § 33, Law No. 299 of 1952 [hereinafter
EITAj8 Id. § 5.
29 Id. § 5-2.
30 Id. § 5-3.
31 Id. §7-3.
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trade associations are exempted by notification 32 or by authorization.33 All
exemptions of agreements require that there must be:
1) no fear of violating international treaties with foreign gov-
ernments,
2) no injury to the interests of importers or enterprises con-
cerned in the country of destination and no fear of gravely
injuring international confidence in Japanese exporters,
3) no fear of injuring the sound development of export trade
4) no unjustifiable discrimination,
5) no unjustifiable restriction of the participation in or the
withdrawal from the agreement, and
6) no fear of unjustly injuring the interests of domestic enter-
prises engaged in agriculture, forestry, fishery, small
enterprises or consumers in general.
If those requirements are fulfilled, the restraint of competition is prohibited
only if it is regarded as "unreasonable," which section 2(6) defines as
"contrary to the public interest." As a result, Japanese law contains broad
exemptions for pure and mixed export cartels, although there has been
criticism regarding the lack of positive requirements.34
International cartels must consider strict requirements. In the
"International Oil Pipe Cartel Investigation" the German Federal Cartel
Office discovered an international cartel where German and Japanese firms
agreed to restrict their exports to third countries.35 After fining the German
members, the FCO notified the Japanese Fair Trade Commission ("JFTC");
the Japanese members then canceled the cartel. 36 The JFTC announced it
would apply the prohibition of international agreements (EITA section 6)
but not the prohibition of "unreasonable restraints of trade" (EITA section
3) to international cartels. 37 An international export cartel with Japanese
participants comes under the AML prohibition of international agreements
regardless of whether it is concluded before or after the formation of an ex-
32 Id. § 11(1).
33 Id. § 11(2).
34 Mitsuo Matsushita, Export Control and Export Cartels in Japan, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 103, 112
(1979); Negishi, Yushutsu karuteru to dokkih(5 tekivyJjgai (Export Cartels and Exemptions from the Anti-
Monopoly Act), 265 KOSEI ToRIHIKi 4-5 (1972).
35 Decision of July 12, 1973 (Oil Pipe Lines), Bundesgerichtschof [supreme court] BGHZ 1276.
36 See Matsushita, supra note 34, at 118.
37 Antimonopoly Act interpretation relating to export cartels and international agreements, reprinted
in HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI UESUGi, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN 275 (1983).
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port cartel. The JFTC's rationale was that an international cartel cannot
fulfill the requirements of the EITA for an exemption because the foreign
parties demand the restriction of the freedom of entry and withdrawal of the
members.38
The competent authority for notification and authorization under the
EITA is MITI and not the Fair Trade Commission. Section 34 of the EITA
obliges MITI only to notify and consult the JFTC. MITI has extensive
power to guide and regulate export cartels as an integral part of Japanese
trade policy. MITI may pass export restrictions under the Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law if they are deemed necessary "for
the maintenance of the balance of international payments and the sound de-
velopment of international trade or the national economy." 39 In this case,
the activities of the concerned firms are exempted from the Antimonopoly
Law by article 65 of the Control Law.40 Section 28 of the EITA authorizes
MITI, if necessary, to ensure the sound development of export trade, to
regulate price, quality, design, and other trade conditions or quantity of ex-
ports, even by non-members of the export cartel. Contrary to the Webb-
Pomerene Act in the United States, which protects non-members from the
cartel, the EITA protects the export cartel from non-members. In practice,
those powers are not used, but MITIs influence is expressed by
"administrative guidance." For example, to develop long term strategies for
national exports, MITI "guided" Japanese exporters by "gyoseishido"
("administrative guidance") in the form of informal advice, persuasion, and
control to promote export cartels. To perform obligations of international
trade agreements or to prevent trade conflicts with other countries, MITI
"advises" the private firms to form an export agreement. Whether or not the
exporters are "compelled" by MITI depends on the individual case. 41 The
presence or absence of compulsion may determine the application of the
importing countries' competition law.
38 See various decisions recited in Matsushita, supra note 34, at 120.
39 Gaikoku kawase oyobi gaikoku b6eki kanri h6 (Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control
Law) art. 48, Law No. 65 of 1979 (restricting the general principle of free export in art. 47); see
Matsushita, supra note 34, at 104; IYORI ET AL, DAS JAPANISHE KARTELLRECHT 131 (1994).
40 IYORI ET AL., supra note 39.
41 Whether or not administrative guidance is "compulsory" and, therefore, immune against the
Japanese Antimonopoly Law remained uncertain in the Oil Cartel Cases; see JFTC STATEMENT
Concerning the Relationship Between the Antimonopoly Law and Administrative Guidance, reprinted in
Akira Negishi, Administrative Guidance and the Antimonopoly Law, 49 RABELS ZEITUNG 189, 277 (1985).
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6. Comparative Analysis
According to the "effects doctrine" most competition laws apply only
to restraints of competition which harm the domestic market. Pure export
cartels without domestic effects are not within the scope of EC competition
law and are exempted by special provisions from all other competition laws
analyzed in this article. Pure export cartels in the United States, Japan, and
Germany are subject to supervision by special provisions. The EC law and
many other less strict competition laws42 provided for neither notification
nor supervision of pure export cartels. Mixed export cartels are subject to
all competition laws analyzed above. The United States and the EC, where
the domestic market has much more importance than export markets,
strictly prohibit mixed export cartels. The export-oriented nations of
Germany and Japan allow mixed export cartels with domestic restraints if
the restraints are ancillary to the restraint in export trade due to export pro-
motion. International cartels are treated differently. Section 6 of the
Japanese Antimonopoly Law prohibits Japanese enterprises from entering
into any international agreement; but the prohibition does not apply to for-
eign participants. In the United States, international cartels are prohibited
because spillover effects within domestic markets are assumed. In
Germany, international cartels are not subject to special provisions. They
have to fulfill the requirement of serving "real protection and promotion of
exports" and shall not include import restrictions relating to the German
Market.
The legislative intents of the various competition laws appear to be
similar to that of the Webb-Pomerene Act. The exemptions were designed
to improve or enable exports of small and medium-sized firms that other-
wise lack individual export ability. Common sales organization and
cooperation in transport are expected to reduce export costs, thus creating a
countervailing power against powerful foreign buyers and competitors. The
existence of exemptions in foreign competition laws is often mentioned as a
reason to enable domestic firms "to play on equal terms."
Other domestic cartels with export activities must be considered
along with the export cartels. For instance, exemptions for small and me-
dium size enterprises and for certain branches must be considered. In this
context, national cartels could use monopoly profits earned in domestic
42 For a comparative analysis see OECD, EXPORT CARTELS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF
EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 22 (1974).
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markets for commonly "dumped" exports. The enforcement of competition
rules and national competition policy in general also influences export car-
tels' activities. Different degrees and instruments of restricting or
promoting domestic export cartels also determine the application of the im-
porting countries' competition law. For instance, the degree and form of
promoting export cartels by the Japanese government through
"administrative guidance" determines the immunity from U.S. antitrust law.
Additional differences in antitrust enforcement appear in the damages avail-
able to litigating parties. The U.S. law allows for treble damage suits which
provide an incentive for private antitrust enforcement. In contrast, there
have been only fifteen private damage claims in Japanese competition law
since 1949.43 Prohibitions of export cartels could be subject to bilateral ne-
gotiations on trade and competition issues if trade policy authorities were
empowered to enact prohibitions. Only MITI in Japan has an express power
to prohibit export cartels. In Germany, the supervision of export cartels lies
in the cartel authority, but the government has an indirect power to prohibit
export cartels by concluding international treaties. In the United States, the
President is not permitted to prohibit or modify an export agreement.44
Differences between the competition laws and the legislative intents
are revealed by analyzing the prerequisites for exemptions. For instance,
laws differ in their treatment of exporting non-members. In the United
States, the exemption fails to apply if domestic competitors are restrained.
Thus non-members of export cooperations are protected by law. On the
other hand, the Japanese Export and Import Trading Act protects the export
cartel against non-members through far reaching powers of MITI to pro-
mote and protect the aims of domestic export cartels. The actual protection
or promotion of national and private exports by every single export cartel is
required only in German competition law. In other competition laws the
legislative intent of export promotion seems to displace the requirement of
actually promoting exports.
The lack of positive requirements has been criticized, and a needs test
has been suggested in several countries. Such prerequisites could assure
that the antitrust exemption is limited to those cases where the exemption is
necessary to assure the ability of domestic exporters to compete and operate
successfully in foreign markets. In practice, the bargaining power of for-
43 From 1949 to 1990, there were only 15 private damage claims related to violations of the
Antimonopoly Law. See IYORI ET AL., supra note 39, at 204.
44 See HAWK, supra note 6, at 102.
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eign buying cartels and monopolies did not need to be proven, although it is
often mentioned in the legislative process. This demonstrates the common
problem of the analyzed competition laws, namely, the differences and
contradictions between the legislative intent, the existing rules, and their
application. Whether the need for legal reforms relating to export cartels is
intensified due to the globalization of international trade and production is
discussed below.
B. Foreign Export Cartels Under Competition Law
1. Extraterritorial Application and Governmental Inducement of Private
Restraints
Concerning the importing country, the question arises whether the
ban on cartels applied to domestic firms also applies to foreign firms. The
doctrine based on the effects principle holds that the importing state has ju-
risdiction to apply domestic competition law to restraints of competition
committed by parties located outside its territory if the restraint causes anti-
competitive effects within its territory. Although this extraterritorial
application probably concerns interests of the foreign country where the re-
straints of competition are carried out, the effects doctrine is generally
accepted in many countries. The applicability of competition law may be
restricted by political issues if the government of the exporting or importing
country is involved. The toleration, promotion, or compulsion of an export
cartel by the foreign government may immunize foreign firms from the im-
porting countries' competition law. The encouragement or compulsion of
the foreign export restraints by the importing countries' government may
also limit the applicability of domestic competition law.
This compulsion raises questions about voluntary export restraints
("VER"s) of exporting firms according to the importing countries' request
and voluntary restraint agreements ("VRA"s) concluded between firms, as-
sociations or the government of the importing country, and firms,
associations or the government of the exporting country. For a comparative
analysis of the application of importing countries' competition laws, differ-
ent types of export agreements must be distinguished according to the
degree of governmental involvement:
1) agreements between private firms
a) without governmental involvement
b) with governmental involvement
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i) with "compulsion" by the exporting country
ii) with "encouragement" by the exporting country
iii) with "encouragement" by the importing country (VER)
2) agreements between the importing country and exporting
firms (VRA)
3) agreements between countries (VRA)
2. Foreign Export Cartels Under U.S. Antitrust Law
a. Extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law
Foreign export cartels which harm the U.S. market may be subject to
section 1 of the Sherman Act. The effects doctrine was first stated in United
States v. ALCOA, where a U.S. court held that the Sherman Act applies
"even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders
that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends." 45 Due
to the fact that almost every act carried out in foreign countries that trade
with the United States might affect U.S. trade, the Sherman Act has been
limited to only such conduct which was meant to produce, and did in fact
produce, some substantial effect in the United States, as was recently stated
in Hartford Fire Insurance v. State of California.46 Whether the "direct,
substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" standard outlined in the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982 also applies to imports,
or is limited to export activities, remained unclear in Hartford.47 This extra-
territorial application of U.S. antitrust laws caused diplomatic protests by
foreign governments which argued that their interests were adversely af-
fected. Due to the broad interpretation of the effects doctrine in Uranium
Trust Litigation,48 several governments enacted blocking statutes to protect
their domestic firms against the U.S. government and private litigants in
antitrust cases.49 These statutes prohibit the disclosure, inspection or re-
moval of documents located in the territory of the enacting state in
compliance with orders of foreign authorities. Furthermore, the clawback
45 United States v. Aluminium Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
46 Hartford Fire Ins. v. State of California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2909 (1993).
47 Id at n.23.
48 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom, Ltd. (In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation), 617 F.2d 1248
(7th Cir. 1980); see also Deepa Rishikesh, Extraterritoriality Versus Sovereignty in International Antitrust
Jurisdiction, 14 WORLD COMPETITION 33, 34 (Mar. 1994).
49 For example, see the Canadian Uranium Information Security Regulations of 1976 and the
Australian Foreign Proceedings Act. See Rishikesh, supra note 48, at 41.
VOL. 4 No. I
EXPORT CARTELS AND RESTRAINTS
provision of the U.K. Protection of Trading Interests Act50 provides for the
recovery of the non-compensatory portion of treble damage awards made by
U.S. courts. Apart from these procedural impediments, several defenses
may restrict the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws in the case of
governmental involvement.
b. Foreign governmental involvement
i Foreign sovereign acts
In cases of foreign governmental acts restricting competition, the act
of state doctrine or the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act may immunize
against U.S. antitrust law. The "classic statement" of the act of state doc-
trine is as follows: "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the
independence of every other Sovereign State, and the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment of the acts of the government of another done within
its own territory."51 The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") 52
codified that a foreign sovereign should be made a defendant in U.S. courts
with regard to its political activities only in exceptional cases. The rule
raises the issue of defining an exception from the FSIA53 and from the act of
state doctrine for commercial activities of a foreign government. When a
U.S. Trade Union tried to recover treble damages in an antitrust suit from
the member states of the OPEC, the suit failed because the Court did not
evaluate the nature of the conduct - which was price-fixing - but the
purpose of the conduct. The preservation and maximization of a national
resource that is vital to the future prosperity and security of the OPEC
member states was regarded as a sovereign activity and therefore immune.54
In this context, the Uranium cartel referred to in Part II.B.2.a above should
have gained the same immunity because it also served the conservation and
exploitation of an important national resource in conformity with the na-
tional economic policies of the foreign governments involved.55 The
50 U.K. Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, reprinted in Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
No. 959, at F-I, 2 (1980).
51 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
52 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-1611 (1982).
53 See, e.g., Joseph P. Griffin, Special International Antitrust Doctrines and Defenses, 60 ANTITRUST
L.J. 543, 549 (1992).
54 International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D.Cal.
1979). For remarks on that decision see Griffin, supra note 53, at 548; see also Rishikesh, supra note 48,
at 48.
55 477 F. Supp. at 553.
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disparity between the Uranium case and the OPEC case indicates that the
defenses are applied in political rather than in legal terms. The foreign
governments involved in the Uranium case would not have injured the U.S.
economy to any greater extent than the OPEC States.56 This demonstrates
not only the influence of political matters in determining antitrust applica-
tion but also that these issues have already crossed the border between
competition and trade policy.
ii. Private inducement offoreign sovereign acts
In the area of foreign sovereign immunity, the question arises whether
there is any antitrust liability in a firm's attempt to influence a government
to take legislative or legal action that may restrict competition. For in-
stance, the Sherman Act might have been applicable to U.S. carmakers'
requests to the U.S. Congress, the President and the Japanese government,
which led to the Japanese Auto-VER in 1981. The Noerr-Pennington doc-
trine "shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort to influence public
officials regardless of anticompetitive intent or purpose... since the right to
petition is one of the freedoms protected by the bill of rights. '57 It was
explicitly noted in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited
that the petitioning immunity "includes concerted attempts to petition to the
judicial branch."58 The "sham exception" limits the doctrine only slightly.
Whether or not the Noerr-Pennington petitioning immunity includes the
right to petition foreign governments has not yet been decided by the
Supreme Court, and the lower courts are split.59 However, there seems to
be a tendency to apply both the Noerr doctrine and the sham exception to
petitioning foreign governments as stated in the Justice Department's 1988
Guidelines.60
56 Id
57 Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961).
58 California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
59 See Coastal States Mktg. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that petitioning
immunity does apply to petitioning of foreign governments). In Sisal Sales, the Court assumed a private
inducement when U.S. sisal traders convinced the Mexican government to monopolize their sisal trade in
Mexico. However, the antitrust violation was furthermore based on other illegal restraints. United States
v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927); see AREEDA & TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 1 272, 273 (1978);
Ulrich Immenga, Internationale Selbstbeschrankungsabkommen zwischen staatlicher Handelspolitik und
privater Wettbewerbs-beschrankung, 49 RABELS ZEITUNG 303, 318 (1985).
60 Griffin, supra note 45, at 550; Michael William Lochmann, The Japanese Voluntary Restraint on
Automobile Exports: An Abandonment of the Free Trade Principles of the GA7T and the Free Market
Principles of United States Antitrust Law, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 99, 138 (1986).
VOL. 4 No. I
EXPORT CARTELS AND RESTRAINTS
iii. Foreign sovereign compulsion
Where the actions of private fiims are indirectly induced by the gov-
ernment to restrict competition, the foreign sovereign compulsion defense
("FSC defense") has to be considered. Even when the private party is guilty
of the wrong charged, it should not be punished because its actions were
compelled by a foreign sovereign. The FSC defense is asserted often but
rarely succeeds. One example of success, however, occurred in
Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo Inc., where the court
stated: "Sovereignty includes the right to regulate commerce within the na-
tion. When a nation compels a trade practice, firms there have no choice
but to obey. Acts of business become effectively acts of the sovereign. The
Sherman Act does not confer jurisdiction on U.S. courts over acts of foreign
sovereigns. By its terms, it prohibits only anti-competitive practices of per-
sons and corporations."'61 The rationale of fairness to the defendant who
may be caught in a dilemma between an order in the exporting country and
a prohibition in the importing country was raised in the Hartford case. The
rationale is that as long as a person "can comply with the laws of both na-
tions at the same time, no true and direct conflict exists between U.S. and
UK law, no matter if the foreign state has a strong policy to permit or en-
courage such conduct." 62 Thus the FSC defense requires true compulsion.
The "mere permission or recommendation, '63 the "approval"'64 or the
"knowledge and endorsement" 65 of a foreign sovereign can not immunize
anticompetitive conduct from antitrust liability.
The question of real compulsion leading to antitrust immunity arose
several times when MITI initiated and supervised export restraints of
Japanese firms by "administrative guidance" or "gyoseishido." This is used
by MITI "to persuade and guide a person to conduct its business in a certain
way, in order to realize an administrative goal through the party's coopera-
tion."66 Although administrative guidance is without legal sanctions, MITI
has been very successful in achieving voluntary compliance with its
administrative requests. To the extent that administrative guidance falls in a
61 Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (D.Del. 1970).
62 Hartford Fire Ins. v. State of California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2911 (1993).
63 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
64 United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Info. Centre, 133 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
65 Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D.Conn. 1977).
66 Statement of Japanese Government before the House of Councilors, Commerce, and Industry
(1970), reprinted in Sanekata, Administrative guidance and the Antimonopoly Law, 10 L. JAPAN 65, 68
(1977).
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spectrum from compulsory orders, backed by civil or criminal sanctions, to
purely voluntary requests without a suggestion of sanctions, Japanese courts
have not clearly decided whether administrative guidance in all cases is a
valid defense against the Japanese competition law.67 In any case, written
directives to form an export cartel should fall within the limits of the FSC
defense. The certain knowledge that compulsory orders would be immedi-
ately forthcoming, were the written directives not obeyed, gives the
Japanese firms no reasonable choice but to comply. According to the act of
state doctrine, the validity of those directives should not determine the ap-
plicability of the defense.68 In addition, an official statement of the foreign
government may be sufficient to prove compulsion. 69 However, while the
private enterprises are immune from foreign antitrust laws, it should be ex-
amined whether the compelling government could be made responsible for
causing trade restraints.
iv. Balancing interests test
As an unmodified effects test applied to foreign conduct may result in
political conflicts, U.S. courts have developed a balancing test to evaluate
the conflicting interests and their impact on the parties involved. This con-
cept was first applied in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America70
which stated, "An effect on United States commerce, although necessary to
the exercise of jurisdiction under the antitrust laws, is alone not a sufficient
basis on which to determine whether American authority should be asserted
in a given case as a matter of international comity and fairness. ' '71 The
court held the following six factors to be relevant:
1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations
of principal places of business of corporations;
3) the extent to which enforcement by either state can be
expected to achieve compliance;
4) the relative significance of effects on the United States as
compared with those elsewhere;
67 See The Petroleum Cartel Cases, Judgment of Sept. 26, 1988 (Japan v. Idemitsu Kosan, K.K.),
Tokyo Krsai [High Court], 985 HANJI 3; Judgment of Sept. 26, 1980 (Japan v. Petroleum Ass'n), Tokyo
Kasai [High Court], 983 HANJI 22.6 V See Lochmann, supra note 60, at 149.
69 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1191 (E.D. Penn. 1981).
70 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 574 F. Supp. 1453, 1466 (N.D.Cal. 1983).
71 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976).
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5) the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or
affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect;
6) the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct
within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.
In Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., the court added addi-
tional factors for this "jurisdictional rule of reason" including "possible
effects upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants
relief."72 In 1987, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law has
incorporated the Timberlane approach in a general clause on prescriptive
jurisdiction, section 403.
Although this balancing approach seems to be more appropriate than
an unmodified effects test, it has been criticized in National Bank of
Canada v. Interbank Card Association.73 The Hartford decision failed to
resolve the conflict between the effects test and the balancing test.74 The
Court also did not decide whether a court must exercise jurisdiction when
the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act ("FTAIA") standard for sub-
ject matter jurisdiction is met, i.e. if the FTAIA supersedes comity
balancing.75 Problems with the balancing approach occur because there is
vagueness as to how the various national interests and other factors should
be weighed and balanced. Furthermore, there are doubts whether courts are
a suitable forum for evaluating national and foreign interests because the
conflicts are finally based on political instead of jurisdictional issues.
c. Domestic governmental involvement
The domestic governmental inducement of foreign VERs raises
questions of both antitrust immunity for the foreign participants and presi-
dential authority for negotiating a VER. Sections 201 and 202 of the Trade
Act of 1974 give the President authority to impose import restrictions only
if the International Trade Commission ("ITC") has determined that the pre-
requisites for import restraints, which are similar to GATT article XIX, are
satisfied.76 Whether VERs must be regarded as import restraints in this
72 Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979).
73 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981). For criticism of a balancing test, see also, Laker Airways Ltd. v.
Sabena, 731 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1984).
74 Hartford Fire Ins. v. State of California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2911 (1993).
75 Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. Law and Global Competition and Trade - Jurisdiction and Comity,
ANTiTRUST REP., Oct. 1993, at 3, 5.
76 Trade Act of 1974, §§ 201-203, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1982); see also Lochmann, supra note
60, at 122.
MAR. 1995
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
sense, so that the President has no authority without a positive ITC recom-
mendation, is uncertain.77 If the conditions for import restrictions are not
met, the President would find himself in a dilemma when trying to negotiate
a VER with foreign exporters. Concerning domestic policy, his negotia-
tions have to be "not binding" and merely "communicating" because of his
restricted authority. On the other hand, the foreign exporters require his
explicit administrative cooperation to obtain antitrust immunity from the
Sherman Act. This conflict became apparent in the case of Consumers
Union v. Rogers, where the executive directly negotiated with Japanese and
European steel producers to limit their exports of steel to the U.S. market.78
The conflict was resolved when the Congress intervened by granting an
antitrust immunity to the participants by the Trade Act of 1974.79 Without
such express- legislative immunity, foreign exporters forming a VER are not
exempted from the Sherman Act.
3. Foreign Export Cartels Under German Competition Law
The GWB applies to all restraints of competition which have effects
or are reasonably likely to have effects in Germany, even if they result from
acts done abroad.80 The ban on cartels, therefore, applies to foreign enter-
prises which have no personal contact with the territory of Germany. The
application of the effects doctrine may be restricted by the rule of non-inter-
vention, which is, nevertheless, directed towards intensive measures only.
Furthermore, the misuse of law as a restriction of public international law
and a balancing test required by comity have been discussed but never ap-
plied in antitrust cases. 81
Regarding the involvement of a foreign government in foreign export
cartels, only compulsion immunizes the cartels from German competition
law. For instance, the FCO started an investigation of a Japanese cartel ex-
porting electronic calculating machines, which was initiated but not
compelled by Japanese authorities. Following negotiations with the
Japanese authorities, the investigation was dropped after the cartel was dis-
77 For a discussion regarding the President's constitutionally inherent authority over foreign affairs
to neotiate VERs, see Lochmann, supra note 60, at 127.
8 Consumers Union v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd in part and rev d in part sub
noma Consumers Union v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
79 Trade Act of 1974, § 607, 19 U.S.C. § 2485 (1982); see Lochmann, supra note 60, at 138.
80 GWB § 98 (2).
81 Rehbinder, supra note IS, § 98 I at 22-27.
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solved.82 Foreign VERs induced by the German government are prohibited
by section 1 of the GWB, although different kinds of exemptions from the
ban on cartels have been suggested. For instance, justification by a rule of
reason because the VER served domestic interests, or a discretionary
decision by the Federal Cartel Office after governmental instruction8 3
cannot create antitrust immunity because of the strict separation of political
and competition authorities in German competition law.84 Beside other
legislative exemptions in the GWB section 8 provides for a ministerial
authorization. The Federal Minister of Economic Affairs has power to
authorize cartels if, in exceptional cases, overriding economic
considerations and the public interest call for a restriction of competition.
Because such authorization may be granted only in exceptional individual
cases (VERs often cause economic disadvantages and, in 1972, the Minister
of Economics described them as principally undesirable) it is expected that
there will rarely be Minister Cartels exempting VERs.85 Even if the VER is
permitted by German authorities, the prohibition of the EC Treaty, article
85, which overrules German law, has to be considered.
Furthermore, the German government's authority for trade agree-
ments and negotiations is restricted because trade policy authority has been
transferred from the member states to the Community by the EC Treaty, ar-
ticle 113. Additionally, the EC Treaty contains rules for the member states
to protect competition which could obstruct the member states from nego-
tiating additional foreign VERs. Article 30 prohibits quantitative
restrictions on imports and all measures having equal effect between mem-
ber states. For instance, it has been applied to governmental measures
promoting or facilitating private restraints of competition. 86 One member
states' inducement of a foreign VER, therefore, could be subject to article
30 if the VER might affect trade between the member states.87 Article 5(2)
obliges the member states to abstain from any measure which could
82 FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 66 (1975).
83 In a written directive of the Minister of Economic Affairs to the FCO on August 9, 1972
concerning "orderly marketing," VERs were assumed to be principally undesirable. But exceptional
temporary agreements must be tolerated for overriding economic considerations. In such cases, the
Minister of Economic Affairs instructs the FCO not to apply competition law in the particular case.
84 Such exemptions would circumvent the obligation to notify and the abuse control by the FCO.
See Immenga, supra note 59, at 311.
85 However, the requirements are not likely to be fulfilled by VERs. For commentaries about VERs
and overall economic interests in the GWB see Immenga, supra note 59, at 310-13.
86 INNO/ATAB, 1977 E.C.R. 2115, 2145 (Nov. 16, 1977); see Miller-Graff, in GROEBEN ET AL.,
EWG-VERTRAG KOMMENTAR, art. 30, at 153.
87 See Wood Pulp 1988 E.C.R. 5193 (Sept. 9, 1988).
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jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty. One of these ob-
jectives is the institution of a system ensuring that competition in the
common market is not distorted (article 3 lit g). However, the enforcement
of those possible limits to import restraints in the form of VERs is restricted
due to the interests of the parties involved.
4. Foreign Export Cartels Under European Competition Law
Concerning EC competition law, the European Court for a long time
did not agree with the Commission's viewpoint on applying the effects
doctrine. In an international Dyestuffs agreement to fix prices for selling
within the Community, the Commission fined those firms located in non-
member states in accordance with the effects doctrine. The Court asserted
jurisdiction by regarding the foreign firms and their subsidiaries inside the
EC as a "single economic unit. '88 The firms acted through subsidiaries in-
side the EC and these subsidiaries had to be considered as the
instrumentality through which the foreign producers themselves had acted
within the Community. In the Wood Pulp case, foreign producers fixed
prices for exports into the EC. The Court held that the territoriality princi-
ple also covered the place of implementation of the agreement, and in the
Wood Pulp case the agreement was implemented within the EC. The Court
added that it was immaterial whether or not the producers had subsidiaries,
agents or branches within the Community to make their contacts with pur-
chasers within the EC.89 Under this broad interpretation of the territoriality
principle, approximating it to the effects doctrine, a foreign export cartel af-
fecting the Community is generally subject to article 85 if there are direct,
substantial and foreseeable impacts within the Community. 90
However, the competition rules apply only insofar as anticompetitive
conduct may affect trade between the member states. This may occur if re-
strictions for imports into the EC prohibit intra-EC firms from using low
priced sources to get goods. This prohibition could increase production
costs and prices of intra-EC firms, leading to a change in the conditions of
competition within the EC.91 In the Wood Pulp case, the effects of the for-
eign agreements on prices and resale within the Community have been
88 Dyestuffs Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., 1972 E.C.R. 619 (July 14, 1972).
89 Wood Pulp 1988 E.C.R. 5193 (Sept. 9,1988).
90 See Advocate-General Mayras in Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd.(ICI) 1972 E.C.R. 619, 703; Koch, in
GRABITZ, KOMMENTAR ZUM EWGV 1990, vor art. 85, at 14.
91 Aluminium Imports from Eastern Europe, D. Comm. Dec. 19, 1984, 1985 O.J. (L 72/1) 46.47; see
GLEISS-HIRSCH, supra note 26, art. 85 (1) Rn 252.
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regarded as affecting competition within the Community. 92 The question of
whether the involvement of a foreign government prevents the application
of article 85 was decided by the Commission while investigating a Franco-
Japanese ball bearings agreement. In 1972, French and Japanese producers
agreed through their business associations to increase prices for Japanese
exports designed for the French market to adapt them to the prices of French
products. The Commission assumed a violation of article 85 but did not
impose fines.93 It published a press release distinguishing four different
kinds of export restraints. 94 The release stated:
1. Measures taken in pursuance of trade agreements
between the Community and Japan do not fall under article 85.
2. Measures that were imposed on Japanese firms by the
Japanese authorities are not subject to article 85. Nevertheless
the prohibition applies to additional agreements and concerted
practices.
3. Article 85 is applicable to measures resulting solely
from agreements, concerted practices, or decisions by
associations of firms, entered into or engaged in either
unilaterally by Japanese firms or in concert with European
firms.
4. Measures resulting from agreements or concerted
practices between Japanese firms that were merely authorized
by the Japanese authorities under Japanese law could be
subject to article 85 because the firms would be free not to
enter into the agreements or engage in the concerted practices.
The Court of Justice confirmed these criteria in the Wood Pulp case.
In that case, a United States export cartel expressly exempted from U.S.
antitrust rules by the Webb-Pomerene Act claimed a violation of the rule of
non-intervention when the Commission imposed fines under article 85 on
the cartel. The court expressly did not decide about the rule of non-inter-
vention because no conflicting requirements by the U.S. and EC authorities
existed. The statutory exemption for export cartels from the application of
U.S. antitrust laws "does not require such cartels to be concluded." 95 In the
92 Wood Pulp, 1988 E.C.R. 5193 (Sept. 9, 1988).
93 Franco-Japanese Ball bearings Agreement, 1974 O.J. (L 343/19).
94 Announcement concerning the import of Japanese goods into the Community that are subject to
the Treaty of Rome, 1972 Nr. C 111 at 13.
95 Id. 20.
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absence of compulsion to engage in the conduct prohibited by article 85,
article 85 applies and can be enforced.
Concerning domestic governmental inducement in foreign restraints,
initiatives by the Commission and by member states have to be distin-
guished. The member states' inducement could be subject to article 30 or
article 5 (2) EC Treaty (see section II(B)(3), "Foreign Export Cartels under
German Competition Law" above). But trade policy measures, including
VERs and VRAs96 by single member states, lose significance since the na-
tional authorities for trade policy agreements in principle were transferred to
the Community (article 113).97 Agreements or concerted practices of firms
in pursuance of trade agreements of the EC are not subject to article 85. But
it remains to be analyzed whether the member states' obligation to promote
and not to jeopardize a system of undistorted competition within the
Community also applies to the Commission. This might restrict the
Commission's authority to negotiate foreign VERs.
5. Foreign Export Cartels Under Japanese Competition Law
In Japan, foreign export cartels could fall under the prohibitions of
unreasonable restraint of trade,98 international agreements, 99 or the corre-
sponding prohibitions for trade associations.100 Unlike other competition
laws, the Antimonopoly Law of Japan does not have any general provision
regarding international application. The principle of territoriality, rather
than the effects doctrine, seems to be the basis of jurisdiction for several
reasons. Other provisions of the AML, for example sections 9 and 10,
expressly state its applicability to foreign enterprises. Additionally, other
Japanese laws designed to be applied to activities carried out outside the
territory usually have special provisions explicitly stating the extraterritorial
96 VERs and VRAs have to be regarded as trade policy measures in this sense. See, e.g., GRABITZ
ET AL., EUROPAISCHES AUBENWIRTSHAFTSRECHT 301 (1994). According to Walter Werner, VERs require
special regulation. WALTER WERNER, SELBSTBESCHRANKUNGSABKOMMEN iM AuBENHANDEL 171 (1984)
(art. 16(1) Reg. No. 288/82 EC).
97 However, numerous examples of VERs to Member States markets include 49 export restricting
agreements of Japanese exporters in 1992 for France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. See GRABITZ ET
AL., supra note 96, at 292. In the late 1980s some fourteen VERs of Japanese cars to various national
markets of the EC were implemented by the Member States. GATT, REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
TRADING SYSTEM 184 (1989); Michel M. Kostecki, Marketing Strategies and Voluntary Export Restraints,
14 WORLD COMPETITION 21, 24 (1991).
98 Sheteki dokusen kinshi oyobi k6sei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru h6ritsu [Law Concerning the
Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Maintenance of Fair Trade] § 3, Law No. 54 of 1947.
99 Id §6
100 Id.§8
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applicability, such as section 2 of the Criminal Code, and sections 36 and
37 of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law. Thus, it may
be inferred from the absence of such provisions that the AML generally
follows the principle of territoriality. 101 Furthermore, Article 98 of the
Japanese Constitution obliges Japan to respect and observe international law
so that the jurisdiction is basically territorial.102
Contested cases in this area have not clarified the international sphere
of application, although the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) report "Restrictive Business Practices of
Multinational Enterprises" regarded the Triple Freight Conference case1 03
as recognition of the effects theory in Japan. 104 But other decisions seem to
hold that an effect on Japanese trade is not a sufficient basis of jurisdiction.
The AML has been applied only When a violation, or part of a violation, was
carried out in Japan. Therefore, a personal connection with the territory of
Japan through resident representatives or agents seems to be required. 105
Ohara described this different sphere of international application, compared
with the strict effects doctrine in Germany, as a result of different character-
istics of the nationals. "The Japanese, who live within typhoon area, have a
general tendency to wait for the passing of an irresistible force such as a ty-
phoon like bamboo, whereas the German character is compared with an
oak."106
The limits of the Japanese competition law were illustrated when the
AML was applied to international cartels affecting Japanese markets. In the
1972 "man made fibres" cases, 107 both Japanese and European firms mu-
tually restricted or prohibited exports to the other country. The JFTC
applied the prohibition of international agreements (AML section 6) only to
101 Mitsuo Matsushita, The Antimonopoly Act of Japan and International Transactions, in
JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW S.1, 6 (1969) [hereinafter Matsushita, Transactions]; Yoshio
Ohara & Robin Stewart, in DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 7.01(l)(d) (Kitagawa & Zentaro eds., 1989).
102 Matsushita, Transactions, supra note 101; Makoto Yazawa, Interim Report of the Committee on
the extraterritorial effects of Trade Regulation, 9 JAPANESE ANNUAL INT'L L. 174, 177 (1965).
103 Triple Freight Conference Case, Judgment of Aug. 18, 1972 (FTC v. Nippon Yusen K.K.), FTC
[decision], 19 Shinketsushii 57.
104 OECD, Restrictive Business Practices of Multinational Enterprises, in REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 37 (1977).
105 See, e.g., Freight Conference Cases, Judgment of May 19, 1971 (Novo Industri S.A. v. FTC),
FTC [decision], 17 Shinketsushfi 297. The foreign firm was not made a respondent because it had no
personal connection with Japan.
106 Yoshio Ohara, International Application of the Japanese Antimonopoly Act, Swiss REVIEW OF
INT'L COMPETITION LAW 7, 11, n.29 (1986).
107 Judgment of Dec. 27, 1972 (In re Asahi Kasei Kogyo Co.), FTC [decision], 19 Shinketsushii
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the Japanese firms. Although imports to Japanese markets were restricted,
the European participants of the international cartel were not made subject
to the proceeding, probably because they had no personal conhection with
Japanese territory.108 Similarly, after price-fixing agreements were carried
out by an international trade association of "felt and canvas," 109 the JFTC
held only the Japanese members responsible for violating section 6 of the
AML. Neither the United States trade association (for violating section
8(1)) nor European member firms (for violating section 6(1)) have been ac-
cused by the JFTC for restricting imports to Japan. Foreign VERs to
Japanese markets have not yet emerged, probably due to the existence of
other barriers to entry.
6. Comparative Analysis
Export cartels restrict competition in foreign markets. If a state opens
its markets to foreigners, it has an interest that the rules and obstacles for
domestic firms also apply to foreign firms enabled to participate in domestic
competition. The European Union, the United States, Germany and most
other OECD member Countries except for Japan follow the effects doctrine,
although definitions of the doctrine vary.
The extraterritorial application of domestic competition law may be
limited if no subsidiaries or agents of the foreign exporters are located
within the import country's territory. Limitations occur in the areas of dis-
covery procedures and the enforcement of prohibitions and fines. Foreign
statutes blocking discovery rules demonstrate that cooperation is missing in
international antitrust cases.
The foreign governmental involvement in an export cartel may hinder
the application of the importing country's competition law. The criteria are
derived from the act of state doctrine and the foreign sovereign compulsion
defense, but neither encouragement nor antitrust exemption of an export
cartel can immunize it from antitrust law, as stated in Wood Pulp. If, and to
what extent, a balancing interests test is able to restrict or extend the appli-
cation remains uncertain in several competition laws. On a national level,
as well as on an international level, there is a lack of explicit rules defining
how the various national interests and other factors are to be weighed and
balanced. Therefore, differences in the promotion and toleration of export
108 See Ohara, supra note 106, at 15.
109 Judgment of Jan. 12, 1973 (In re Nippon Felt Co.), FTC [decision], 19 Shinketsushi 109; see
also Ohara, supra note 101, at 16.
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cartels in the exporting country also determine antitrust application in the
importing country.
The domestic governmental inducement of foreign VERs .raises
questions both of antitrust immunity for the foreign participants and do-
mestic authority for negotiating a VER under trade laws. In general, only a
binding agreement (VRA) concluded with the domestic government, but not
pure "encouragement" or "communication," can cause antitrust immunity
for the foreign exporters. Additionally, in Germany an antitrust exemption
of a foreign VER requires an authorization by the Federal Minister for
Economic Affairs, which is granted only if the VER serves the economy as
a whole and the public interest (Minister Cartel, GWB section 8). This
demonstrates the separation of political and competition related matters in
German competition law and policy. In the United States, the presidential
authority for import restraints is limited by the provisions of the Trade Act.
If the Trade Act also applies to negotiating agreements with foreign export-
ers, the prerequisites for import restraints determine antitrust immunity. In
the EC, the member states' ability to negotiate a foreign VER is restricted
because trade policy authorities were transferred to the Community by arti-
cle 113. Furthermore, the EC Treaty could restrict the member states' and
also the Commission's authority to negotiate foreign VERs.
However, even if domestic provisions for negotiating foreign VERs
are not fulfilled and antitrust immunity is not granted, there is a lack of en-
forcement. If a foreign export cartel serves national trade policy by
displacing other import restraints, national competition authorities and
courts are reserved in applying competition law. In this area the lack of
distinction between private and governmental restraints demonstrates the
link between competition and trade policy.
III. EcoNOMIc ANALYSIS OF EXPORT CARTELS
Although VERs in most cases are similar to aggressive export cartels
in their effects of increasing prices and decreasing quantities, the interests
and objectives of the concerned firms and governments differ. Therefore,
the economic consequences of VERs and normal export cartels must be ex-
amined separately.
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A. Economic Consequences of Export Cartels
1. Objectives and Consequences for the Exporting Country: Export
Promotion vs. Domestic Repercussions
a. The objective of export promotion
The exporting countries' antitrust exemptions for export cartels are
intended to* promote exports by enabling small and medium producers to
enter into and survive in foreign markets. Reducing export costs and form-
ing a "countervailing power" against foreign buying cartels and competitors
are expected to enable domestic firms to "play on equal terms" on interna-
tional markets. In addition, aggressive export cartels are tolerated or even
promoted to serve national welfare. "What's good for General Motors is
good for the country when sellers are domestic and buyers are foreign.""I10
The intent of a single export cartel - like that of a single enterprise
- may contain an increase or decrease in prices, quantities, turnover or
profit. For instance, an increase in profits may be caused by price cuts as
well as by price increases. Under certain circumstances even lower profits
or losses are taken into account for a transition period to enter into foreign
markets as demonstrated in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. "'1
While export cartels in theory may contain different objectives and
instruments, and therefore permit no consistent evaluation, it is questionable
in practice if they serve to promote national exports. The positive effect of
export promotion may be outweighed by negative repercussions on domes-
tic markets. However, knowledge of this balance remains incomplete due to
missing disclosure provisions and a presumably large number of unknown
violations.
Concerning Japanese export cartels, VERs are regarded as an integral
part of Japanese trade policy. In the early 1980s, almost half of the regis-
tered Japanese export cartels were from the textile industry, relating to the
Multifibre Arrangement."12  While in 1977, price fixing agreements
dominated, in 1992, most export cartels included quantitative restrictions., 1 3
110 Whitney, supra note 10, at 397.
Ill 513F.Supp. 1100,1191 (E.D.Pa. 1981).
112 OECD, supra note 42, at 30.
113 According to Matsushita, in 1977, 31 out of 86 registered export agreements were price-fixing
and 25 included quantitative restrictions. I  March 1991, 20 out of 31 export cartels were trade
associations, 10 included agreements between producers and sellers, 4 price-fixing agreements, 21
quantitative restrictions, 2 quality agreements and 10 compulsory cartels. Matsushita, Transactions, supra
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The total number of registered export cartels decreased from 175 in 1972,114
to 25 in 1993.115 Apart from VERs, it has been assumed that Japanese ex-
port cartels were centered in industries where production is concentrated
among very few firms, in which Japan occupies a large share of the total
world market and in products that face few close substitutes in demand. In
other words, they were formed to exercise market power abroad by firms
which were able to export on their own.
An empirical analysis by Andrew Dick indicates contrary results."16
His analysis is based on contrary price and quantity effects of typical export
cartels' activities. He concludes that the exercising of common market
power abroad generally leads to a price increase accompanied by a quanti-
tative restriction. Cost reducing and enabling small and middle-sized firms
to export on competitive foreign markets generally increases quantity and
lowers export prices. Guaranteeing delivering schedules, establishing in-
dustry brand names, and common quality standards may shift the export
demand rightward, yielding an increase in export volume and price. Due to
the price and volume impacts, he distinguishes whether the export cartel's
role was monopoly-promoting, cost-reducing, or quality-assuring. The
study indicates that exercising common market power has little significance.
It shows that Japanese export cartels mostly consist of small and medium-
sized exporters in unconcentrated industries where Japan accounts for a
small share of total world production. Results of the study, however, are
questionable since many other factors, such as the power. of foreign com-
petitors and buyers, general changes in demand, exchange rates and trade
policy developments were neglected.
In Germany, available information is rare because notifications of
pure export cartels are not published. Analyses of the past indicated price
cartels were predominant and joint sales agencies were rare. 117 Considering
the fact that almost half of German export cartels had domestic market
note 101; see also IYORI ET AL., supra note 39, at 131, 222. However, considering the number of
compulsory cartels it has to be mentioned that in most cases cartel behavior is caused by "administrative
guidance" without legally binding orders.
114 Negishi, supra note 41, at 302 (according to JFTC-Reports).
115 According to the JFTC, at the end of 1993 there were 23 export cartels still existing, including
23 export associations (§ I I(I)) and 2 agreements of producers and sellers (§ 5-3). JAPAN FAIR TRADE
COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT 186 (1994).
116 Andrew Dick, The Competitive Consequences of Japan's Export Cartel Associations, 1992 J.
JAPANESE & INT'L ECON. 275.
117 See EDWARDS, CARTELIZATION IN WESTERN EUROPE 19, 21 (U.S. Dep't of State Policy
Research Study, 1964); Kurt Markert, Zur gegenwfirtigen Situation der Exportkartelle, 1970
AUSSENWiRTSCHAFTSDIENST 99, 105.
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shares of more than seventy-five percent, it seems likely that a substantial
part of "cartelized" exports is accounted for by firms strong enough to ex-
port on their own.1 8 In its 1970 annual report, the Federal Cartel Office
doubted whether all German export cartels in fact protected and promoted
exports. 119 Presently there are two mixed and fifty pure export cartels, of
which half are international export cartels. 120 German export cartels ac-
counted for two percent of total German exports.'21
Regarding the United States, an FTC Staff Report122 in 1967 indi-
cated that Webb-Pomerene Associations consisted primarily of large firms
operating in concentrated industries and marketing standardized products.
Only in a few exceptional cases did they serve to significantly reduce the
costs of exporting. There were few indications that export cartels were nec-
essary as an instrument of countervailing power against cartels of foreign
competitors or foreign buyers. Sometimes a foreign buying cartel was
formed just as a reaction to the U.S. export cartel. 123 Later analyses by
Larson 24 and Amacher 125 also indicated a significant positive association
of WPAs with industry concentration and product homogeneity. At their
peak during the 1930s, WPAs handled approximately nineteen percent of
U.S. exports. 126 In 1982, when the Export Trading Company Act was
enacted, WPAs accounted for only two to three percent of U.S. exports. 127
Although the Export Trading Act offers more protection to export cartels, it
has not significantly spurred U.S. exports. One hundred twenty-seven
118 OECD, supra note 42, at 49; see also Rehbindersupra note 15, § 6 at 23; Markert, supra note
117, at 105.
119 FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, supra note 15, at 21; OECD, supra note 42, at 49 (No. 138).
120 For a report of mixed export cartels, see FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 169
(1991-92). Publications about pure export cartels are rare; at the end of 1984, 53 pure export cartels were
existing. See FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 140 (1983-84). Out of 55 export cartels 25 had
foreign participants.
121 In 1981, German export cartels shared for 2% of German exports with a total amount of 7-8
billion DM. FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 196 (1981-82).
122 UNITED STATES FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC REPORT ON WEBB-POMERENE
ASSOCIATIONS: A 50-YEAR REVIEW 6 (1967); Larson, An Analysis of the Webb-Pomerene Act, 1970 J.L. &
ECON. 462.
123 See Markert, supra note 117, at 105.
124 Larson, supra note 122.
125 Amacher et al., Note on the Webb-Pomerene Law and Webb-Cartels, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 371
(197866 OECD, supra note 42, at 30:
127 See Whitney, supra note 10, at 395; Victor, supra note 9, at 573. According to the Federal
Trade Commission, WPAs shared for 1,5 per cent of U.S. exports. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
MEMORANDUM: ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO WEBB-POMERENE QUESTIONNAIRE 15 (1978).
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Export Trading Companies were registered in the first nine years. 128 These
were mainly small and mid-sized firms with a share of U.S. exports below
one percent. 129
Compared with an estimated export cartel ratio of twenty to twenty-
five percent in Japan, 130 the share of registered "cartelized" exports of
about two to three percent in the United States and Germany seems to be
insignificant. Yet in several industries, the share of such exports is signifi-
cant.131 As a result, existing case study evidence suggests that the typical
export cartel consists of oligopolistic firms trying to restrict exports rather
than consisting of competitive firms trying to promote exports. Most cartels
are in fact not defensive in this sense, but instead must be regarded as ag-
gressive measures. Considering the role of VERs and the missing survey of
international cartels - a large number of non-registered international car-
tels has to be assumed 132 - the export restricting role seems to outweigh
the export promoting role of export cartels. Whether the net profits of the
member firms compared with the overall economy export reduction cause
positive or negative effects for the exporting country has to be examined
case by case.
b. Repercussions on domestic markets
Apart from the beneficial effects which appear infrequently, export
cartels can cause various problems for domestic competition and other ob-
jectives of the exporting country. They frequently have repercussions on
domestic competition, even if there is an explicit clause in the cartel con-
tract that no internal effects are intended. 133 Comparable to "side effects" of
joint ventures, the exchange of information on prices, costs, capacities and
sales policies may influence the domestic competitive conduct of the cartel
members and lead to conscious parallelism. Every export cartel whose
members account for a substantial share of domestic production can influ-
ence domestic supplies and prices through its export decisions. Such
128 Victor, supra note 9, at 575.
129 In 1986, ETC export total was about one-tenth of one percent of U.S. merchandise exports in
1986. See Nye, supra note 9, at 311.
130 See Dick, supra note 104, at 275, 276.
131 FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1981-82); HANS H. GLISMANN, WETTBEWERBS
BESHCRANKENDE ABSPRACHEN IM AUSSENHANDEL 31, 32 (1975).
132 OECD, supra note 42, at 46; Markert, supra note 117, at 102; FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE,
ANNUAL REPORT 70 (1971).
133 OECD, supra note 42, at 50.
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spillovers occur if the export quantity influences utilization of capacity and
therefore, uno actu, the total output and the domestic sales. 134 Sometimes
dumping abroad might be made possible by monopoly profits earned in
domestic markets. An additional domestic effect is the exclusion of com-
petition between export traders. 135 Furthermore, the typical long term
problems of price and sales quota cartels must be regarded. Such problems
include the delay of technical progress, increasing costs, and a tendency for
over-capacity. For the exporting country, export cartels are, therefore, not
necessarily beneficial. However, contrary to increasing export revenues,
those disadvantages are difficult to evaluate and are not immediately appar-
ent.
2. Consequences for the Importing Country
For the importing country, foreign export cartels may be beneficial if
they are formed by small and medium-sized firms which are thereby en-
abled to export. Export co-operation may also lead to higher quality and
lower prices by reduced export costs. On the other hand, export cartels may
maintain or create barriers to trade by forcing customers to pay high, non-
competitive prices or by limiting the quantity of imports. In these ways,
their effects are similar to import cartels or domestic cartels. The opportu-
nity for an export cartel to exercise market power abroad is greater if it faces
less domestic competition. In this case, countries with less developed in-
dustries are more likely to get hurt than highly industrialized countries with
competitive domestic industries.
3. International Cartels and Strategic Alliances
International cartels combine export restrictions by exporters from
different countries. Thereby producers of two countries often reserve their
domestic markets when they mutually agree to refrain from selling in the
other country (mutual international cartels). When this happens, the agree-
ment affects domestic markets. In contrast, there are common international
cartels consisting of firms of different exporting nations that affect only
third country markets, for example, the OPEC. The cartel can be directed to
one or more importing countries, including in most cases territorial divi-
134 Erich Hoppmann, Wettbewerbspolitik und Exportkartelle, JAHRBUCH FOR NATIONALEKONOMIE
UND STATISTIK, Band 173, 343, 372 (1961).
135 Id at 370.
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sions. Therefore, direct international cartels consisting of firms of different
countries and indirect international cartels consisting of different countries'
export associations must be distinguished.
International cartels gained importance especially in the 1920s and
1930s when there were estimated to be between 250 and 1200 cartels.'
36
One study indicated that international cartels accounted for approximately
forty-two percent of world trade. 137 When world trade broke down through
"beggar-thy-neighbor policies," it became apparent that over-capacities had
been constructed due to the increased demand in the war period of 1914-18,
the erection of new production centers in separated markets during the war,
and the post-war boom of the 1920s. Some assumed that the problems of
such over-capacities could better be resolved by output-allocating agree-
ments of private international cartels than by government restraints. Private
firms would more likely close the most inefficient factories with the highest
production costs, while governmental negotiations could protect inefficient
firms of powerful nations. It was assumed that international cartels could
complement, or even displace, import tariffs and serve to prevent dumped
exports spurred by subsidies and a devaluation of the exporting nation's
currency. In this context, Great Britain increased its import tariff for steel to
improve the bargaining position of its producers that were entering into an
international cartel of continental steel producers. When the international
agreement was concluded with an improved position of British steel pro-
ducers, the British import tariff was lowered again.138
Furthermore, it was assumed that international cartels serve to stabi-
lize prices, especially those of primary commodities which often face
inelastic demand. This led to the discussion about buffer stock cartels
regulating trade in primary commodities. However, the price of preventing
desperate beggar-thy-neighbor strategies by allowing international cartels is
the monopolistic price-fixing of the "cartelists" and the lack of tariff reve-
nues for each country. Therefore, such trade policy objectives would better
be pursued by negotiating mutual abolishment of trade restraints or, as a
second choice, by government restraints like tariffs.
The decreasing number and significance of international cartels since
the 1940s may have been caused by the strict prohibition of U.S. export
136 Wagenfdlhr, KARTELLRUNDSCHAUJ, Band 38, N. 7; Frederick Haussmann & Daniel Ahearn,
International Cartels and World Trade, an Explanatory Estimate, 1944 Q. REV. FORDHAM U. 429.
137 Haussmann & Ahearn, supra note 136, at 434.
138 See INTERNATIONAL CARTELS: A LEAGUE OF NATIONS MEMORANDUM, 1948 II.D.2, at 39.
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cartels since then, the resulting absence of U.S. firms, and by stricter en-
forcement of competition law in other countries. However, a large number
of non-registered international cartels must be assumed to still exist.139
Today new forms of international co-operation have emerged which
might require different evaluation. Especially in strongly integrated sectors
like electronics, firms of different countries are interrelated through partici-
pation structures and joint ventures, including inter-firm research,
production, and marketing programs. In this context, concerns are ex-
pressed that pro-competitive joint ventures might be treated like "usual"
international cartels which restrict quantities and increase prices by protect-
ing each cartel members' domestic market. The so-called "strategic alli-
ances" are suspected in some cases to be the first step to an attempt of mul-
tinational enterprises to build up their own private market organization by
avoiding antitrust conflicts.140 On the other hand, such co-operation in re-
search and development, combined with exchange of information in global
networks, could be regarded as a contribution to promote a public good.
This would require a rule of reason for strategic alliances.141 Considering
that other countries allow their firms to participate in strategic alliances, it
could be beneficial for a nation to allow domestic firms to do the same in
order not to exclude them from developing "future markets." Therefore, it
has to be suspected that each countries' antitrust enforcement concerning
ancillary restraints may be cautious so domestic firms are not unnecessarily
impeded. Hence, only multilateral rules and institutions can prevent re-
straints of competition by such strategic alliances.
4. Export Cartels'Effects on World Trade
The fact that export cartels may have beneficial effects in one country
and harmful effects in another country raises the question whether the net
effect is positive or negative. Assuming that the exporting country is
benefited, three results are possible. First, the importing country may also
benefit by enabled or quality-improved exports, or by lower prices. Second,
the losses for the importing country caused by quantitative restrictions and
price increases could be outweighed by the benefits for the exporting coun-
139 For example, in a routine control the German FCO discovered that the domestic members of a
registered international export cartel participated in another international export cartel which had not been
notified. See FEDERAL CARTEL OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 70 (1971); see Markert, supra note 117, at 102.
140 Wolfgang Kartte, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Feb. 15, 1992 (former President of the
German FCO).
141 A. MODY, LEARNING THROUGH ALLIANCES (World Bank Paper 23,1990).
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try. For instance, the protection may give domestic producers time to invest
and become internationally competitive and, hence, reduce the overall dis-
advantages to the concerned countries. Third, the importing countries'
losses caused by aggressive export cartels may outweigh the benefits in the
exporting country because of "dead weight losses." Like other trade re-
straints, export cartels not only redistribute rents but may also cause overall
net losses. Negative net effects occur only in the last of the three cases. As
shown by evidence in other trade restraints, this has to be assumed to be the
most likely case. Additionally, the resulting distortions of competition im-
pede economical adjustment and evolutionary processes. Foreign
retaliatory actions in the form of import cartels, anti-dumping measures, or
subsidies may be caused by export cartels.
Apart from those direct consequences, indirect economic effects re-
sult from the interdependence of the legal treatment of export cartels in
different countries. Applying game theory, the exemptions for export car-
tels encourage the formation of cartels and restrict international trade in
three ways. First, foreign exemptions for export cartels create an incentive
for one country to grant such exemptions to enable domestic firms to par-
ticipate on equal terms in international markets. 142 Second, exempting
export cartels intensifies the tendency towards international cartels, causing
decreases in international output and the volume of trade.143 This occurs
because an indirect international cartel consisting of national export cartels
is more stable than a direct international cartel consisting of firms from dif-
ferent countries, which are not allowed to form national export cartels.
Third, antitrust immunity for foreign sovereign compulsion of export cartels
may be an incentive for more active regulation of national exports by
crossing the border between "encouraging" and "compelling" export car-
tels.144
B. Economic Consequences of VERs
Although voluntary export restraints are carried out by foreign ex-
porters, they are initiated by the importing country where they serve to
displace other import restrictions. Therefore, the effects on the importing
country should first be examined.
142 OECD, supra note 42, at 51.
143 See HOPPMANN, WETTBEWERBSPOLITIK UND EXPORTKARTELLE 362.
144 "Extraterritorial conflicts are therefore a source of sharper political conflict by pushing states to
regulate their exporting companies." Rishikesh, supra note 48, at 44.
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1. Objectives and Consequences of VERs in the Importing Country
According to the traditional economic theory of international trade,
free trade increases the general welfare of all trading nations because each
trading nation can consume more goods than it could have produced itself in
the absence of international trade. Although each trading nation has an ag-
gregate economic gain from international trade, individual persons and
industries will not necessarily benefit from free trade. Consumers and im-
port-demanding industries gain from lower priced imports. The import-
competing industries face increasing competition and become the economic
losers of free trade. The introduction of a trade barrier can change the eco-
nomic winners and losers. Consumers and import-demanding industries are
burdened by increased import prices. The Japanese Auto VER for the U.S.
market in the 1980s, for instance, cost U.S. consumers an extra $4.3 billion
per year. The VER raised prices for Japanese and U.S. cars by an extra
$400 per auto. One study indicated that 2 million Americans wanted to
purchase new cars but were priced out of the market.145 The VER of
Japanese videotape recorders to the EC in the mid-80s caused price rises of
up to 50 percent.146
On the other hand, the import-competing industries and their workers
profit from the introduction of a trade barrier. The U.S. car production in-
creased from 7 million cars in 1982 to 9.2 million in 1983 and to 11.1
million in 1984.147 The annual profits of U.S. automakers increased to
$5.65 billion in 1983 and $9.7 billion in 1984 after losses in the preceding
years. 148 The wage increase for U.S. autoworkers was almost twice the
average.149 According to traditional trade theory, the loss to the consumers,
to import-demanding industries, and to export industries. outweighs the
benefits to the import-competing industries caused by trade barriers. Like
other import restraints, VERs are normally requested as a temporary, de-
fensive and exceptional measure to cope with an extraordinarily difficult
145 See David Pauly et al., Car Quotas: End of the Road? NEWSWEEK, Feb. 18, 1985, at 65;
Lochmann, supra note 60, at 112.
146 Kostecki, supra note 97, at 27.
147 Lochmann, supra note 60, at 112.
148 In 1980 and 1981 they had losses of 4.2 and 1.3 billion U.S. dollars. Id
149 Id
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situation in the importing countries' industry. Most VERs, however, are re-
newed and tend to be permanent. 150
Such economic disadvantages for the importing country are caused
by VERs, as well as by other trade barriers. However, VERs differ from
other import restrictions in important ways. First, VERs discriminate
against one exporting country while tariffs and quotas are generally non-
discriminating in accordance with the most favored nation principle of the
GATT. Second, the scarcity refit of a VER is collected by foreigners.
Under a tariff, part of the loss due to the increasing prices is recouped by the
government through tariff revenue. Under a quota, the scarcity rent could
be collected by the government if it levies fees for the right to import the
restricted good. If it does not collect fees for import licenses, the rents ac-
crue to domestic persons holding the import licenses. Under a VER, any
scarcity rent is collected by the foreign exporters or by the foreign govern-
ment if it sells export licenses. Third, contrary to tariffs, VERs add a hidden
cost because they disturb the invisible hand of the market.151 If consumers'
habits change and demand increases, or if technological developments in-
crease foreign supply, imports would automatically increase under a tariff.
Under non-tariff barriers, like import quotas or VERs, imports could not in-
crease until the state reacts to the changes with increased quotas.
Furthermore, VERs are less flexible than import quotas because the state
decision also depends on foreign license holders who may try to delay the
quantitative increase to keep their rental profits. The implementation costs
of governmental regulation of VERs are difficult to evaluate. 5 2 They might
be lower than administrative costs of tariffs. But negotiating VERs with
several exporting countries can multiply transaction costs.
Despite those economical disadvantages for importing countries,
VERs seemed to have displaced other import restrictions with progressive
150 For instance, the Japanese Auto-VER to the United States in 1981 and the following years, the
Japanese and European steel exports VER from 1969 and VERs about textiles from Asian countries
starting in 1956 have all been partly renewed several times. See Misao Tatsuta, Voluntary Export
Restraints - Implementation and Implications, 49 RABELS ZEITUNG 328, 329 (1985).
151 Lochmann, supra note 60, at 114.
152 It was assumed that the U.S. government spent about $500,000 annually as a budgeted cost in
connection with the textiles and steel VER. Comptroller-General of the United States, Economic and
Foreign Policy Effects of Voluntary Restraint Agreements on Textiles and Steel, reprinted in JOHN H.
JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT
(1977).
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growth. According to Kostecki, 153 about ten to fifteen percent of world im-
port volume in the late 1980s was subject to VERs. This is not only caused
by the greater protection afforded domestic producers through the quantita-
tive effect as compared with tariffs. VERs are more flexible than other
restrictions. They may be expressed in terms of value of exports, volume of
exports, market share, increase in market share, minimum export prices or
distribution strategies and conditions.
There are three basic methods to share markets between domestic and
foreign suppliers. 154  Under the home-industry-first approach, the risk of
demand fluctuation is borne by the foreign suppliers. Under the exporter-
first approach the risk of demand fluctuation lies with the domestic suppli-
ers. The constant-market-share approach shares the risk of demand
fluctuation between the foreign and the domestic suppliers. Most important
is the fact that VERs can be negotiated by the government of the importing
country without public interference. While tariffs require parliamentary
legislation, VERs are subject to executive branch negotiations. 155 This
helps to speed up the procedure and may prevent domestic policy conflicts
as well as discussions about protectionism. The responsibility seems to be
transferred to the foreign exporters.' 56 VERs thereby reflect the interests of
certain pressure groups trying to change the distribution of income in their
favor, even if the welfare of the country as a whole is reduced.
2. Domestic Effects of VERs in the Exporting Country
Faced with threatened import restrictions, the exporting country may
attempt to protect its remaining export chances by concluding a VER. The
exporting firms or associations are more willing to accept a VER because
the request for it is accompanied by a threat of protectionist action. They
may also fear the use of anti-dumping or anti-subsidy procedures with the
accompanying risk of becoming tied up by their competitors in costly legal
proceedings designed to put them under pressure.
153 For 1986, he estimated 10%. His 1991 study indicated that 15% of world trade was covered by
VERs. Michel M. Kostecki, Export-Restraint Arrangements and Trade Liberalization, 10 WORLD ECON.
425-453 (1987); Kosteki, supra note 97, at 21.
154 Id. at 23.
155 See REINHARD QUICK, EXPORTSELBSTBESCHRANGKUNGEN UND ARTIKEL XIX GATT 156;
BRUNO FREY, INTERNATIONALE POL1TISCHE EKONOMIE 46 (1985).
156 For commentaries about the U.S. President's negotiations about the Japanese Auto-VER, his
"merely communicating" role and the responsibility for the restraints, see Lochmann, supra note 60, at
130.
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Whether exports are truly restricted or enabled through the VER de-
pends on the real threat posed by other import restrictions. Compared with
import restrictions based on the GATT escape clause, VERs are more flex-
ible for the exporters because duration and quantity can be re-negotiated.
The exporters may compensate for revenue losses caused by the quantitative
restriction by increasing their export prices. In most cases, export prices are
adapted to higher local prices in the importing country to protect the import-
ing countries' industries. Moreover, exports may be shifted to larger, tech-
nologically more advanced, and therefore, higher priced products if the
restraint agreement concerns only quantities and not revenue. 157 Such
"upgrading effects" occurred when Japanese car producers during the Auto-
VER shifted their exports to larger, more luxurious and expensive cars and
earned record high profits.158 Although such upgrading would have been
possible without a VER, the quantitative restriction connected with higher
profits might not have been carried out independently because Japanese
firms typically care more about growth than about short term profitability in
export markets.159 Hence VERs do not necessarily harm the requested ex-
porters and the exporting country.
Problems in the exporting country may be caused by the distribution
of export licenses. The established firms need not fear new domestic com-
petitors which are hindered from participating in the foreign market because
exporters' shares are fixed. Additionally, spillovers into domestic markets
are to be suspected by export agreements. In the long run, the export indus-
tries' competitiveness may be jeopardized.160
3. The Effect of VERs on Third Countries
As a result of a VER, exporters may shift to third country markets.
For instance, it was claimed that as a result of the Japanese-European ar-
rangements, Japanese steel producers had shifted their exports to the United
States market and therefore violated section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974.161 It is possible that increased prices caused by restricting exports
157 NEWSWEEK, Feb. 14, 1985, at 65, col. 2.; Tatsuta, supra note 150, at 344.
158 Tatsuta, supra note 150, at 344.
159 Kostecki, supra note 97, at 25.
160 Tatsuta, supra note 150, at 344.
161 Id. at 345.
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serve to "dump" export prices for third countries which could give rise to
antidumping measures or to another VER.162
Third country exporters may extend their market shares due to the
foreign VER. For example, Taiwan had a ninety-four percent increase in
color TV exports to the United States during the Japanese VER in 1977.163
Such an extension reduces the effectiveness of a VER as an import restraint
and gives rise to further VERs with other countries, causing a chain reac-
tion.1 64
In addition, third country exporters of similar products may also be
affected. For example, the upgrading effects shifting Japanese car exports
into the United States to larger, higher priced models distorted and sharp-
ened competition in these markets at the expense of German car producers.
It is questionable if the third countries' trade or competition laws cover such
conduct by protecting its exporters. 165 Without international co-operation,
such problems are unlikely to be resolved.
4. The Effect of VERs on World Trade
Contrary to "real" export cartels, which may simultaneously restrain
competition in some ways while promoting competition in other ways, a
VER restrains competition in foreign markets and international trade. In the
importing country, the loss to consumers and import-demanding industries
outweighs the benefits to the import-competing industries. Whether the
price rise turns the losses caused by the quantitative restriction into profits
for the restricting exporters is uncertain. More certain is that for the export-
ing countries, not only export quantities, but also export revenues decrease.
162 Due to the Japanese Auto-VER for the U.S. market, Canada and several European countries did
not initiate GATT proceedings but tried to negotiate further Japanese VERs for their markets. See Quick,
supra note 155, at 277.
163 Robert C. Klose, The Orderly Marketing Agreement with Japan: Implications for U.S. Trade
Policy, N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG., S. 246, 260 (1978).
164 Glismann, supra note 119, at 228.
165 U.S. antitrust law, for instance, does not only protect U.S. consumers in international cases but
also U.S. exporters. This follows from the U.S. Department of Justice's announcement to delete footnote
159 in its 1988 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, which had been interpreted
to protect exclusively U.S. consumers. Dep't of Justice Press release of April 3, 1992, cited in Trade Cas.
(CCH) 13,108. In this context the Canadian Patent Pool case has to be mentioned when U.S. exporters
were hindered to export to Canada. United States v. General Elec. Co., 1962 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,342
(June 25, 1962); United States v. Allen-Bradley Co., 1962 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,420 (July 31, 1962);
United States v. General Elec. Co., 1962 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,546 (Nov. 1, 1962); see also Yoshio
Ohara, The New US. Policy on the Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Laws, and Japan's Response,
17 WORLD COMPETITION 49, 50 (1994).
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Altogether a decrease in international trade and "dead weight losses" for the
countries concerned must be expected
Due to the selective effects of VERs, their distortions of competition
exceed those of other import restraints like tariffs or quotas. For example, if
the restricted exports of country A are displaced by exports from third
country C, the importing country B might call for another VER of C's ex-
porters. This might improve the export chances for exporters from third
country D. Additionally, if A's and C's exports to B are restricted, they
may shift to importing country E which might request a VER. Additional
VERs requested by other importing countries from additional exporting
countries may cause a cumulation of interventionism leading to a beggar-
thy-neighbor policy. In addition to welfare losses caused by protection, a
large number of VERs leads to high transaction costs. Furthermore, VERs
are often requested because the exports are believed to be dumped or sub-
sidized. This demonstrates the links between VERs and other issues of
trade policy like anti-dumping and anti-subsidy measures. It also demon-
strates the need for global solutions.
IV. APPROACHES AND SUGGESTED CHANGES
A. Overlaps, Conflicts, and the Grey Area Between Trade and
Competition Policy
1. Problems and Conflicts Arising from Export Restraints
As demonstrated above, the economic consequences of export re-
straints, intensified by their legal treatment, endanger the welfare of the
concerned countries and world trade liberalization for several reasons. The
legislative intentions to exempt export cartels are inconsistent with the legal
treatment and the actual appearance of export cartels. Enforcement of com-
petition law against export cartels is limited due to the lack of incentives
and the lack of co-operation by the concerned governments. "Real" export
cartels as well as VERs cause net aggregate losses, if not individual losses,
to all concerned countries which might gain from liberalization of global
trade. There is a lack of incentives to strictly enforce limitations on, or to
unilaterally abandon, export cartel exemptions because national benefits are
expected from domestic export cartels. Possibly harmful foreign VERs are
regarded as beneficial or are inadequately controlled in the face of powerful
protectionist pressure groups.
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A grey area between trade and competition policy exists when private
respondents deny their responsibility by maintaining that they were com-
pelled by their governments, and governments deny their responsibility and
circumvent GATT obligations by referring to the private nature of the re-
stricting agreement. Therefore, the private or governmental responsibility
for different types of agreements must be clearly determined. The appli-
cability of competition rules for private restraints and trade laws and GATT
rules for public restraints is discussed below. The question of whether ex-
isting trade rules and the developing World Trade Organization ("WTO")
system cover those restraints must be analyzed before further approaches
are discussed.
2. The Distinction Between Governmental and Private Restraints
Agreements between exporting firms are private export cartels and
should fall under both domestic and foreign competition law. However, the
statutory antitrust exemptions enabling and promoting export cartels could
be regarded as trade restraints and, therefore, also be subject to international
trade approaches. If exporting firms are only encouraged or allowed to
"cartelize" by the exporting state, they are not immune from foreign com-
petition law. If exporting firms are compelled by the exporting state, they
are immune from foreign competition law because the restriction is actually
caused by the state. Therefore, the exporting state should be responsible
under trade policy agreements, for example, in the GATT system.
Import restricting agreements between importing countries' firms and
exporting countries' firms are private international cartels which fall under
competition law.
Trade agreements between the importing state and the exporting state
are not subject to competition law. Those voluntary restraint agreements
(government-to-government VRAs) should be treated as trade policy issues
like other import restrictions.
Regarding agreements between the importing. state and exporting
firms, export restraints with binding obligations, which were compelled,
must be distinguished from encouraged VERs. A binding agreement be-
tween the importing state and exporting firms (government-to-industry
VRA) could be treated as a private iestraint of competition or as a public
trade restraint. A trade policy approach could prohibit the importing state
from inducing foreign export restraints by treating such action like other
import restrictions. On the other hand, according to the competition policy
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approach, the importing countries' competition law could prohibit foreign
export restraints despite whether the domestic government requested the
restriction. A national approach could prohibit the agreement or require
special provisions, like a minister cartel in Germany. But if the government
itself requested the restraint, it is unlikely that its own cartel authorities - if
not identical with the government - will take actions against the VER.
Therefore, a competition policy approach must ensure antitrust enforcement
by national or international cartel authorities if it is to prevent such agree-
ments. Hence only an international competition policy approach, ensuring
strict enforcement, or a trade policy approach could prevent restricting
agreements between the importing state and exporting firms.
A non-binding, merely "communicating," agreement between the im-
porting state and exporting firms (VER) could also be subject to a trade
policy or a competition policy approach. The trade policy approach is re-
stricted because non-binding agreements are not published. The threat of
antitrust or trade law impediments in the importing country is an incentive
to both parties not to publish the agreement. Therefore, such restraints
might be difficult to prevent by treating them like public restraints. Regard-
ing VERs as private restraints of competition in the importing country leads
to problems similar to binding government-to-industry VRAs. They should
be prohibited by domestic competition law, but due to the governmental in-
volvement there is a lack of enforcement. The competition policy approach
therefore must be international.
B. Approaches to Governmental Restraints
1. VERs in the GA7T-WTO System
a. VERs in the GA 7T before the conclusion of the Uruguay Round
Because trade agreements between states and most export restraints
induced by governments are not subject to competition law, questions arise
whether, and how, states should be responsible for such trade restraints. If
both concerned countries are contracting parties to the GATT, the
introduction of a non-tariff trade barrier could violate the free trade rules of
the GATT.
Article I of GATT, the Most Favored Nation ("MFN") clause, re-
quires that "any advantage, favor, privilege, or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like prod-
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ucts originating in or destined for the territories of all other Contracting
Parties." For example, an agreement that restricts only Japanese TV exports
to the United States market could violate the MFN clause in two ways.
First, it would give other contracting parties an advantage relative to the
United States because they could import an unlimited number of Japanese
TVs. Secondly, and additionally, it would give other contracting parties an
advantage relative to Japan because they could export an unlimited number
of TVs to the United States market.
Article XI(l) of GATT prohibits all import restrictions other than du-
ties, taxes or other charges, and therefore principally covers VERs. 166
However, GATT contains several exceptions to the prohibition of quantita-
tive restrictions. The balance of payments clause in article XII permits a
state to implement import restraints "to safeguard its external financial po-
sition and its balance of payments." However, this could not justify an
export quota unless the exporting state could argue that a large trade surplus
was something that it wished to avoid. 167 Additionally, VERs cannot meet
this exemption because the balance of payments clause requires the trade
restraints to be nondiscriminatory (article XIII (1)).
The safeguard clause in article XIX permits a state to use temporary
import restraints to ease the hardships of adjustment and ensure an orderly
and gradual shift towards more efficient industries. The four prerequisites
for the restraints are:
1) an unusual increase in the quantity of imports of a specific
product,
2) resulting from unforeseen developments,
3) which must be the result of GATT obligations incurred and
must cause or threaten the injury,
4) and cause an actual or threatening serious injury to
domestic producers of like kind or directly competitive
products.
Whether or not an import restraint in accordance with the safeguard clause
is required to fulfill the MFN clause is not expressly stated in article XIX of
GATT and remains uncertain. 168 The application of the MFN clause would
166 See Immenga, supra note 51, at 324; QUICK, supra note 155, at 261; Tatsuta, supra note 150, at
345; Lochmann, supra note 60, at 117.
167 Lochmann, supra note 60, at 118.
168 An interpretative note to article 40 of the Havana Charter indicates that the Contracting Parties
intended the restraints to be nondiscriminatory. See Lochmann, supra note 60, at 121.
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automatically prevent the safeguard clause from justifying a VER.
Nevertheless, the enforcement of the GATT principles in the case of VERs
is limited within the GATT framework. In the case of a violation of article
XI, it is generally possible for a contracting party to diminish or eliminate
certain advantages of another contracting party by opening GATT proce-
dures according to articles XXII and XXIII. But due to the parties involved,
such actions are unlikely to be taken. Compared to other import restraints,
both negotiating parties are interested in the implementation of a VER.
Exporting third countries may extend their market shares due to the
VER. Importing third countries may become the target of shifted exports.
But instead of initiating a GATT procedure due to the violation of article
XI, they may prefer to threaten it and to force the exporting country into
another VER, for the reasons stated above. This demonstrates the lack of an
international institution to ensure enforcement of the GATT rules. The
control of VERs by the GATT is additionally restricted by the lack of notice
because VERs are rarely published. The negotiations are rather secret, ne-
glecting third countries' and domestic third parties' interests. 169
Furthermore, it has been argued that MFN and reciprocity are too unrealistic
to cope with current situations and that the disadvantages of costly safe-
guard measures for the importing country are an incentive to use VERs
instead of other import restrictions in accordance with article XIX of
GATT.170 Therefore, grey area measures like VERs serve as exceptional
measures which are not sufficiently enabled and allowed by the safeguard
clause of GATT. They will exist as long as the requirements of the safe-
guard clause are not reformed.
In this grey area between GATT rules for states and competition rules
for private undertakings, VERs remain in most cases without sanctions.
Nevertheless, VERs are selective, bilateral measures in contrast to the ob-
jectives and system of GATT. The multilateral system of GATT was
designed, inter alia, to improve the situation of smaller countries with less
negotiating power. VERs reflect the economic power of an importing state
related to foreign exporters. 171 Hence, they jeopardize a multilateral "rule
oriented system" by returning to a "power oriented bilateralism."' 72
169 QUICK, supra note 155, at 280.
170 See Tatsuta, supra note 150, at 346; QUICK, supra note 155, at 154,282.
171 Hindley, Voluntary Export Restraints and the GATT's Main Escape Clause, 3 WORLD
ECONOMY 313,331 (1980-81).
172 John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, J. WORLD TRADE L.
93,98 (1978).
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Reforms were, therefore, suggested that should explicitly announce the
applicability of GATT rules to VERs. Reforms should facilitate the imple-
mentation of safeguards while simultaneously requiring conditions for
safeguards. To achieve notice, flexibility, and multilateralism through an
effective safeguard clause, it was demanded that safeguard measures be de-
gressive and temporarily restricted, and that clear provisions for limited
exceptions and the prerequisites for safeguard measures be enacted. 173
b. VERs in the GA 7T after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round: The
"Agreement on Safeguards"
The agreements of the Uruguay Round include an Agreement on
Safeguards relating to article XIX of GATT. It contains clear provisions for
safeguard measures and explicitly mentions VERs in article 11:
Furthermore, a Member shall not seek, take or maintain any
voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or
any other similar measures on the export or the import side.
These include actions taken by a single Member as well as ac-
tions under agreements, arrangements and understandings
entered into by two or more Members. Any such measure in
effect on the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement
shall be brought into conformity with this Agreement or phased
out in accordance with paragraph 2.174
This clarifies that the implementation of VRAs and VERs fall under the
prohibitions for other import restrictions. Existing restrictions shall be
phased out. For example, the EU-Japan agreement on voluntary restraints
of Japanese car exports is terminated December 31, 1999.175 Therefore, ex-
port restricting agreements are more likely subject to negotiations and
procedures in the WTO system. Due to this explicit mention, transparency
might be improved. For instance, the Trade Policy Review Mechanism
practiced since 1989 might encourage resistance of consumers and import-
173 See Immenga, supra note 59, at 326; QUICK, supra note 155, at 282.
174 Treaty Establishing the World Trade Organization [WTO Treaty], Annex IA: Multilateral
Agreements on Trade in Goods, Agreement on Safeguards, art. I1 (1)(b) [hereinafter Agreement on
Safeguards]; Prohibition and Elimination of Certain Measures, in Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The
Uruguay Round, Trade Negotiations Committee, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Marrakesh, April 15, 1994.
175 Agreement on Safeguards art. 11(2).
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demanding industries in the importing country against powerful protection-
ist pressure groups which initiate VERs.
Additionally, the use of VERs might decrease because the demand for
such grey area measures depends on the opportunities to invoke the safe-
guard clause. The reforms, by clearly defining "serious injury, ' 176 by
restrictions on the duration, 177 by the degressivity of the measures17 8 and by
limiting selective measures under special circumstances, 179 might facilitate
the use of safeguard measures according to article XIX of GATT. Hence,
the objectives of VERs can partly be pursued through such safeguard meas-
ures that might therefore displace VERs.
To what extent this contributes to the prevention and abolishment of
VERs depends on the development and success of the WTO system. A
further need for grey area measures must be suspected. Through the explicit
prohibition of governmental agreements (VRAs), the grey area is reduced to
an inducement of foreign export restraints without notice or publication. An
importing country may circumvent GATT obligations by requesting
"voluntary" export restraints. Although the threat of other import restric-
tions is reduced due to the reforms of the safeguard clause, exporters might
furthermore be willing to accept VERs instead of facing other import re-
strictions. Such VERs without proven governmental involvement are not
sufficiently covered by the prohibitions of the Agreement on Safeguards.
Instead of a trade policy approach, a competition law approach could
possibly improve the control of VERs. While a trade policy approach pro-
hibits VRAs and the inducement of foreign VERs, an international
competition law approach would require each nation to apply its domestic
competition law to foreign VERs. This issue may be compared with the
displacement of the trade policy approach of antidumping rules by the
competition law approach of applying rules on predatory pricing.180 In this
context, the "domestic policy function" of international rules protecting na-
tional interests against powerful protectionist pressure groups is only partly
fulfilled by GATT rules. On the contrary, domestic competition law could
be directly applicable in the importing country. Nevertheless, the
enforcement of national competition law by national cartel authorities
176 Id. art. 4
177 Id art. 7.
178 Id. art. 7 (4).
179 Id art. 5 (2)(b).
180 See Harry First, An Antitrust Remedy For International Price Predation: Lessons from Zenith v.
Matsushita, 4 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 211 (1995).
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against foreign VERs which were requested by the domestic government is
limited. This might be compensated for if private suits of domestic
consumers or import-demanding industries were possible. However, this
opportunity is limited to few countries and, furthermore, is restricted by
several defenses as shown above.
Because no state is willing to unilaterally abandon its ability to
restrict imports by such a tacit antitrust permission, this "prisoners
dilemma" can only be solved by international cooperation. For instance,
enforcement could be strengthened if an international authority was able to
sue before national courts and initiate proceedings against national cartel
authorities. A proposal for such an international competition policy
approach submitted to GATT is mentioned in the chapter on "Multilateral
Approaches" to private restraints.
In conclusion, expressly prohibiting VERs in the Agreement on
Safeguards serves to improve the successful liberalization of international
trade by treating VERs like other import restrictions. But if the WTO can
not significantly abolish international trade conflicts, an international
competition policy approach would be preferable to the trade policy
approach.
2. Other Restrictions for States Inducing VERs
Besides international obligations in the GATT/WTO system, the ex-
ecutive's power to negotiate foreign VERs may be limited by national trade
laws or competition laws. In the United States, national responsibility for
trade policy authority is provided by the Trade Act. The International Trade
Commission must determine whether specific requirements similar to article
XIX of GATT are satisfied before trade restraints may be implemented. If
the Trade Act were applied to the new Agreement on Safeguards, the
"communication" in international trade negotiations aiming at foreign VERs
could also be prevented. This would demonstrate the domestic policy func-
tion of international rules.
Consequent enforcement of national competition law with a strict
separation of political and competition related decisions, and an
independent cartel authority, could possibly prevent harmful foreign VERs.
It could at least provide for special requirements, like a minister cartel in
German competition law (GWB section 8). The Treaty of the European
Union could possibly prohibit the member states' or even the Commission's
involvement in foreign export restraints by applying article 5 (2) or article
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3. The implementation of similar provisions into an advanced WTO could
be discussed after a further liberalization of international trade.
C. Approaches to Private Restraints: Present and Potential Strategies in
International Competition Law
Obviously there is a missing institutionalized link between
competition policy and international trade. Some countries have taken steps
to fill this gap. International constraints and distortions of competition
caused by private actors are subject to different unilateral, bilateral,
regional, and multilateral approaches. It should be examined whether
competition laws need to be reformed, enforcement needs to be
strengthened, or new substantive or procedural regulations and agreements
must be developed to fill this gap.
1. Unilateral Approaches
a. Unilateral approaches in the importing country
One might think that the strict application of competition law in the
importing country under the effects doctrine could solve the problems
arising from export cartels.' 8 ' The effects doctrine could be more
successful here than in other areas of competition law because export cartels
are directed abroad so that relatively few interests of the exporting country
need to be considered. Nevertheless, the enforcement depends on the
foreign state. The foreign government actually controls this by supporting
investigations and enforcement, or may hinder it through blocking statutes.
Even if the effects doctrine is applied, different obstacles remain in
the case of international cartels which affect several countries. If more than
one importing and one exporting country are -concerned, different
competition laws may lead to different legal results which need to be
reconciled. There is no real consensus among nations to recognize the
effects doctrine because its definition varies.
On an international level, clear and uniform criteria for the rule of
non-intervention, the misuse of law, and a balancing test would be
desirable. However, states may not be willing to accept the loss of
sovereignty and of the power to decide on political terms about foreign
export cartels as long as substantially different competition policies exist.
181 Heinz Hauser & Rainier E. Schtine, Is There a Need For International Competition Rules?,
AuSSENWiRTSHAFr 205, 242 (1994).
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Unilateral reforms concerning foreign export cartels face the conflict
between legal certainty and the legal capacity for foreign policy. The
attempt to replace comity balancing with its legal uncertainties by a
jurisdictional balancing approach was made by the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law (Third). It limits jurisdiction by a "reasonableness" test
where the relevant factors for reasonableness are similar to the Timberland
approach.I82 Although international conflicts resulting from export cartels
might be generalized and regulated by law more easily than other fields of
international competition policy, the political nature of the conflict remains.
As experience shows, such conflicts might be resolved only by diplomatic
actions. 183
b. Unilateral approaches in the exporting country
From an international perspective, exemptions for aggressive export
cartels which do not enable or promote exports should be abolished because
of the net losses to the concerned parties. Due to the expected national
benefits of its export cartels at the expense of other countries, no country is
willing to unilaterally relinquish its exemptions. This "prisoners dilemma"
can only be resolved by international strategies providing an international
public good. Nevertheless, national laws exempting export cartels require
legal reforms even for the purpose of improving national welfare. The
objectives should be the real promotion of exports by every export cartel
displacing the just legislative intent, an improved supervision of export
cartels to prevent domestic repercussions, and the prevention of political
conflicts. Although there are disputes about the criteria for examining the
risks and positive effects of export cartels, a global exemption without close
examination contains enormous risks and disadvantages. But the other
extreme of strictly prohibiting each export cartel association would also
endanger national welfare because, in some cases, they may be export-
enhancing and beneficial to the exporting country as well as to the
importing country.
Reforms of the broad exemptions for export cartels should include the
application of national competition law to all export cartels. This could en-
182 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 402-03. For commentaries see Fox,
supra note 75, at 4.
183 See Ulrich Immenga, Extraterritoriale Rechtsanwendung zwischen Recht und Politik,
FESTSCHRIFT FOR KARL H. NEUMAYER 323, 334 (1986).
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hance the cartel authorities' supervision by making each export cartel
subject to notification or permission.
Whether or not a publication of the cartel activities serves the
national interest is difficult to determine. Perhaps the prosecution of
exempted domestic export cartels by foreign cartel authorities should not be
supported because the exploitation of foreign markets by foreign restraints
serves national interests. On the other hand, the protection of domestic
exporters which are not members of the export cartel requires publication.
National competition laws could require the real promotion of national
exports by each cartel. Therefore, positive requirements, for example a
needs test requiring that the power of foreign buyers or competitors has to
be individually proved, would be necessary. Also, a harmonization with
national cartel exemptions would be desirable. Furthermore, the protection
of export traders and producers which are not members of the cartel could
be improved with respect to long run competitiveness. With regard to
international cartels - the existence of which sometimes cannot be
prevented by one state - it could be beneficial to allow domestic firms to
participate if they are not able to export at all outside the international
cartel. It should be analyzed whether or not domestic restraints or
repercussions exist. Therefore, it must be analyzed whether different types
of international cartels regulate or affect domestic markets, include import
restraints (i.e. whether they are common or mutual), are direct or indirect,
are aimed at one or more importing countries and whether they do really
face powerful foreign buyers.
Supervision of international cartels is especially important to prevent
domestic and import restraints. In this context, the "German solution,"
providing for limited supervision of international cartels by exempting
them, may be preferable to a total legal ban with a large number of
unknown cartels. Furthermore, the relations between strategic alliances for
improving research and development and enforcing rules about international
cartels have to be clearly identified to secure legal certainty and protection
of competition.
2. Bilateral Approaches
a. Mutual abandonment of export cartel authorization
As previously shown, no country is willing to unilaterally relinquish
its right to exempt national exporters from its own law due to expected
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national benefits of its export cartels. Yet a mutual abandonment by two
countries could be beneficial to both countries. If aggressive export cartels
are regarded as trade policy instruments to increase national welfare at the
expense of foreign countries, they are logically the subject for bilateral trade
negotiations. An exporting country could agree to prohibit single or all
export cartels related to the other country or support antitrust investigation
and enforcement of the importing country. Prerequisite for such an
abandonment is that the trade policy negotiators have the power to prohibit
export cartels, a power which usually lies with the cartel authority. This is
provided in Japan by the broad foreign policy powers of MITI. In
Germany, the government has an indirect power to prohibit export cartels
by concluding international treaties which oppose the permission or
exemption of cartels. In the United States, the president has no express
power to prohibit U.S. export cartels.18 4
It is doubtful that export cartels could be subject to trade policy nego-
tiations in isolation from other competition policy issues. First, mutual
"disarmament" of export cartels is inadequate if the goal is to counter the
power of foreign firms and that power remains. Controlling abuses by
powerful buyers and sellers in the importing country may be necessary to
correct the restraint of competition power. Second, bilateral solutions are
limited when trade relations are rarely bilateral. Additionally, they could
jeopardize the multilateral GATT objectives. Third, the lines between
cartels, strategic alliances, joint ventures, mergers, and abusive practices
become blurred. A clear separation of export cartels from other competition
policy issues is difficult. Fourth, if export cartels were prohibited due to
trade policy objectives, even competition enhancing cartels might be sacri-
ficed in power oriented negotiations.
b. Bilateral agreements on procedural co-operation
Several international antitrust conflicts, including private antitrust
suits, have led to governmental negotiations and were finally decided for
political reasons such as the "OPEC," "Uranium" and "Swiss
Watchmakers" cases in the United States.185 Meanwhile, these types of
intergovernmental consultations have been shifted to the earlier stage of
preliminary investigations by formalized bilateral agreements. Such
184 See HAWK, supra note 6, at 102.
185 See supra notes 40,46, 56.
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agreements have been concluded, for example, between the United States
and Canada,186 the U.S. and Germany, 8 7 and the U.S. and Australia. 188 The
agreements provide for inter-governmental notification, exchange of
information, and coordination of actions and proceedings when important
interests of the other contracting party are involved. Similar provisions for
international antitrust co-operation have been developed and adopted by
OECD recommendations for international co-operation. 189 The US-EC
agreement,190 though just declared invalid by the European Court, provided
a new progressive element. Beyond negative comity, which restricts the
application of domestic laws because of conflicting foreign interests, the
agreement requires positive comity. 191 The contracting parties are obliged
to enforce their laws as strictly as possible in the international activities of
their firms. However, if export cartels are allowed because they have no
domestic effects, the reach of positive comity is limited. The other
arrangements are mostly procedural with foreign officers assisting the
others in gathering evidence. The agreement between Australia and New
Zealand1 92 seems to be a remarkable effort. In addition to a harmonization
of substantive rules, jurisdiction is extended to foreign firms. The
enforcement of competition law against foreign firms by national authorities
is not impeded by international law and is effectively supported by the other
nation's authorities.1 93  Such bilateral arrangements are mostly found
between countries which have very similar substantive rules. Conflicts
remain as long as countries have substantially different competition policies
and different opinions about trade and competition law and policy.
186 See, e.g., The Joint Statement concerning Co-operation in Antitrust Matters, 8 I.L.M. 1305(1969 23 I.L.M. 275-281 (1984).
947 Agreement Relating to Mutual Co-operation Regarding Restrictive Business Practices, June 23,
1976. See A.V. LOwE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION: AN ANNOTATED COLLECTION OF LEGAL
MATERIALS 228 (1983).
188 Agreement Relating to Co-operation in Antitrust Matters. June 29, 1982, reprinted in 21 I.L.M.
702-09 (1982).18 9 Recommendations were published in 1967, 1973, 1976, 1979, and 1986. OECD, COMPETITION
POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE, OECD INSTRUMENTS OF COOPERATION (1987).
190 AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF THEIR COMPETITION
LAWS, SepL 23, 1991, reprinted in 15 WORLD COMPETITION 155 (1991).
191 Id arL V.
192 Reprinted in part in PETER MOZET, INTERNATIONALE ZUSAMMENARBEIT DER
KARTELLBEHORDEN 127 (1991).
193 Id. at 75.
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3. Regional Approaches
There are regional approaches, such as the treaty rules of the EC and
NAFTA, that try to harmonize or rationalize competition policy within the
region. The EC, with its strict prohibition of export cartels directed to other
member states, 194 demonstrates the possibilities of a mutual abandonment
of export cartels. It is important that supranational European law is directly
applicable and enforceable. A supranational authority, the European
Commission, has power to investigate in each member state.
Effective implementation of common substantive rules requires a
similar understanding of competition policy to cope with the losses of
sovereignty caused by powerful supranational institutions and jurisdiction.
In national legislation by EC countries there has been an effort to
harmonize. Countries without antitrust laws have largely incorporated rules
similar to articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty. Convergence in interpreting
and applying the laws is promoted through co-operation and participation
by national antitrust authorities in the Commission's decisions.
In this context, further efforts have emerged concerning the European
Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries and Eastern European States. The treaty
between the EC and the EFTA countries regarding the European Economic
Space obligates the EFTA countries to adopt EC substantive law. The
Association Agreements between the EC and Poland, Hungary and the
Czech Republic reflect constraints arising from EC competition law. While
the effects of regional co-operation on international trade conflicts may be
uncertain, in the fields of competition policy and export cartels such co-
operation should be regarded as a first step towards global harmonization.
Nevertheless, such control of international cartels is limited to the
participating nations, leaving third countries unprotected.
4. Multilateral Approaches
a. The need for international cooperation through global competition
rules
Similar to the situation of "pure" trade policy conflicts, the ability of
bilateral or regional approaches to solve problems of international
competition policy diminishes with the globalization of trade relations,
because the effects of international restraints are rarely restricted to one or a
194 Art. 85.
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few countries. 195  This is not limited to "indivisible products" like
international air transport service. If different countries are affected by
international cartel activities, conflicts of law arise as well as political
conflicts. The European Union demonstrates that some kind of a "level
playing field" for undertakings could be provided through the
harmonization of competition laws. International firms are exposed to
different competition laws in every country because of the effects doctrine.
In addition to such common problems of international competition
policy issues, export restraints require multilateral co-operation for other
reasons. When considering an abandonment of export cartel authorization,
the "prisoners dilemma" arises. No country is willing to relinquish its
exemptions unilaterally because export cartels are believed to improve
national welfare. As long as national politicians do not pay attention to
possibly harmful effects on their trading partners, they invite retaliation.
Such uncoordinated "beggar-thy-neighbor" policy led to the breakdown of
world trade in the period between the World Wars. The "Trade Policy
Dilemma" as a non-cooperative game, therefore, has to be solved by co-
operation. Even though some players have to give up nationalistic aims and
gains, the corresponding welfare losses of others could be avoided, and
global welfare improved. Furthermore, the supervision of international
cartels by single states is restricted. In this context, the lack of incentives to
strictly apply national law to international cartels when only national firms
can be effectively prevented from participating has to be addressed. As
shown above, VERs in the grey area between trade and competition policy
are covered only partially by a trade policy approach. An international
competition law approach is required to complement international trade
rules and domestic competition law.
b. Former international approaches
The internationalization of competition rules is not a new
phenomenon. The 1948 Havana Charter ("ITO") contained a chapter on
restrictive business practices but failed to be ratified as a whole. The
discussion continued, especially in the OECD and within the United
Nations Convention on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD"). The
UNCTAD Code, a set of multilaterally agreed principles for rules
195 See Phedon Nicolaides, Towards Multilateral Rules on Competition, 17 WORLD COMPETITION 5
(1994).
MAR. 1995
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
controlling restrictive business practices, was never ratified. The OECD
Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices developed OECD
recommendations, which of course have no binding legal force. Yet the
OECD recommendations have improved the exchange of information and
the cooperation between the member states.
Sovereignty losses and the great new divergences in trade,
development and competition policies have been the biggest obstructions.
Therefore, enforcement of minimum standards by national authorities and
an international authority with limited power is the most that can be
expected in the near future. Such a proposal is the Draft International
Antitrust Code which has been presented to the GATT.
c. The Draft International Antitrust Code submitted to the GA TT
In July 1993, a Draft International Antitrust Code was submitted to
the GATT.196 An independent group of academics 197 worked on this draft
which proposes to implement a rule-oriented system instead of a power-
oriented dispute settlement.198 The Draft declares that "agreements, under-
standings and concerted practices between or among competitors that fix
prices, divide customers or territories or assign quotas are illegal"'199 if at
least two countries are affected.200 The basic principles of the Draft Code
are the pure application of national law adapted to common minimum
standards, national treatment for foreign firms, and the limitation of the
Draft Code to cross-border cases. To improve the enforcement by national
cartel authorities, the Draft Code provides for international procedure
initiatives. An International Antitrust Authority shall be empowered to sue
in a contracting party's own national court when the contracting party has
failed to enforce its law in violation of its code obligations. 20 ' By
196 Wolfgang Fikentscher & Ulrich Immenga, Draft International Antitrust Code (1995), reprinted
in 64 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1628, Special Supplement, at S.1-22 (August 19, 1993), also
reprinted in WORLD TRADE MATERIALS, Sept. 1993, at 26.
197 The group included J. Drexl (University of Munich), W. Fikentscher (University of Munich),
E.M. Fox (New York University), A. Fuchs (University of G6ttingen), A. Heinemann (University of
Munich), U. Immenga (University of Glttingen), H.P. Kunz-Hallstein (Max-Planck-lnstitute Munich),
E.U. Petersmann (University of St. Gallen), W.R. Schluep (University of Zurich), A. Shoda (Sofia
University, Tokyo), S.J. Soltysinski (Universities of Poznan and of Pennsylvania) and I.A. Sullivan
(Southwestern University Los Angeles).
198 Art. 20 sec. 3(c) IAC; see Wolfgang Fikentscher, Der "Draft International Antitrust Code" -
Initiative fur em Weltkartellrecht im Rahmen des Gait, WIRTSHCAFT UND WE TBEWERB 97, 103 (1994).
199 Art.4 § 1.
200 Art. 3 § Ia.
201 Art. 19.
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guaranteeing the application of national law, the losses of sovereignty are
relatively small and a competition among regulatory systems remains
possible. This suggested implementation into the GATT gives hope for
success because GATT provides the required institutional and legal linkage
for the liberalization of trade and competition rules. The history of GATT,
the large number of member states and the existing dispute settlement
system as a basis for the WTO are further reasons for optimism. The
growing need for global competition rules with the globalization of trade
relations has been increasingly stressed in recent years.202 Even if the Draft
is not implemented in the near future, it is a framework for intensified
discussions.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Curbing the use of VERs, which concern trade policies as well as
competition policies, by the "Agreement on Safeguards" expressly
prohibiting them, is a first step toward the abolishment of grey area
competition restraints. However, this trade policy approach needs to be
complemented by an international competition law approach due to
enforcement problems and possible circumvention.
Export cartels also require an international approach because effects
on different countries cause conflicts of law and political conflicts. The
"prisoners dilemma" requires a mutual abandonment of export cartel
exemptions as a public good. International cartels cannot be supervised and
controlled by single countries applying national law. The prospects for
global solutions depend on the development of the World Trade
Organization. Without a successful implementation of a rule-oriented trade
system, a return to a power-oriented bilateralism would also hinder global
competition rules.
202 See, e.g., Sir Leon Brittan, Competition Policy in the European Community: What's new in the
Old World?, 14 WORLD COMPETITION 5 (1991); Wolfgang Kartte (former President of the German Federal
Cartel Office), Ein Handelskodex der Grossen Sieben, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNO, Feb. 15,
1992, at 13; Nicolaides, supra note 177; L.J. Bergstrom, Should the GATT be Modified to Incorporate a
Restrictive Business Practices Provision?, 17 WORLD COMPETITION L. & ECON. REV. (1993); Bernhard
Dujim & Helen Winter, Internationale Wettbewerbsordnung - Alternativen und ihre Probleme,
WIRTSCHAFr UND WETTBEWERB 465-474 (1993); Edwin A. Vermulst, A European Practitioner's View of
the GA77'System, 16 WORLD COMPETION 5 (1993); Emst-Ulrich Petersmann, Proposals For Negotiating
International Competition Rules In the GATT-WTO World Trade and Legal System, AUSSWlRTSCHAFT 49
(1994); OECD Committee Lacks Enthusiasm for Draft International Antitrust Code, Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 771 (Dec. 16, 1993).
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